The Benefits of Peaceful Dialogue With Iran

By François Géré
Le Figaro, 23/07/08

July 20, 2008, in Geneva, the American diplomatic corps agreed to meet with Iran's for the first time. It was about time, too, since the Iranian nuclear crisis will enter its sixth year in a few days. It was in August 2002 that the revelation of the clandestine enrichment activities at Natanz set off a confrontation between Iran and the international community. Six years is too long. Yet, we still need to know how to get out of the deadlock.

By war? President Bush and his vice president send mixed signals about that. "All options are on the table," they repeat, while in London on June 16, the American president acknowledged Iran's right to a civilian nuclear industry. In Israel, the potential successors to Mr. Olmert, Shaul Mofaz and Ehud Barack believe it electorally profitable to outdo one another over Iran. Nonetheless, not a day goes by without Western and Eastern - including Israeli - media experts and editorialists presenting the military option as inadequate, ineffective, immediately disastrous, as much for the Middle East as for the whole world. Therefore, let's eliminate that collision course. And on the contrary, let's consider the benefits each of the parties could derive from a lasting agreement.

Iran has everything to gain. The package Javier Solana presented June 14 gave assurances of the advantages that would accrue to Iran in the event of an agreement, advantages in the nuclear domain as well as in that of economic cooperation.

Accepting this honorable offer, respectful of its sovereignty and its rights, would allow Tehran to leave diplomatic isolation, get rid of its image as a state suspected of complicity with terrorist organizations and recover a reputation as a trustworthy partner.

Access to global financial and trade mechanisms would then open. That is all the more essential in that Iran is suffering from economic backwardness that three years of calamitous management have worsened. The results are known and publicly denounced by the new Parliament: galloping inflation, squandered oil income. The mushrooming of global agricultural commodities' prices aggravates the situation. Iran barely profits from mushrooming oil prices because it has to pay higher prices for gasoline it is unable to produce.

For its part, Washington also has a great deal to gain. Such an agreement would allow the US to find the paths to a gradual retreat from Iraq, while maintaining some bases and improving the situation in Afghanistan. It would also be a good opportunity to reestablish regional equilibrium, given the difficulties with certain Sunni states rich in both oil and in radical Islamism! Finally, the United States would rapidly recover lost economic positions.

Israel would be done with the nightmare of a nuclear aggression and, over the long term, enjoy the opportunity to rediscover a natural partner in Iran, instead of an artificial ideological enemy. A pacified Iran could favor solutions in Lebanon - even in Palestine - which would no longer be subject to the logic of a zero sum game.

A durable stabilization of the balance of power in the region could be established, one that would limit the arms race which has already begun. The specter of the military nuclearization of the Persian Gulf would be warded off. The European Union, China and Russia would gain credibility from having asserted themselves as effective mediators in a high-risk diplomatic context.

Under those conditions, the UN would strengthen its status as the unique legitimate international institution. While nonproliferation regimes would see themselves upheld, the IAEA would consolidate its role, which it could strengthen to the extent the Arab-Persian zone develops civilian nuclear energy.

For everyone, the end of the crisis would calm the convulsions of the global economy. Everyone could satisfy their energy needs at prices equitably stabilized. Then, it would be possible to begin the long and indispensable process of rebalancing fossil and nuclear energies. Consequently, there is an enormous amount to be gained and hardly anything to lose. However, this calculation is far from being accepted, so numerous are the forces of negation. For the influence of ideologues must be bridled and the action of warmongers countered. This assumes an end can be put to provocative statements and bellicose displays. This also demands respect for every Iranian's gut need to finally feel as though they are taken into account. Once lost, trust takes a long time to be reestablished. It's out of the question to accept agreements of convenience, or to trust without verifying. We must take Mr. Velayati at his word when he announces a new Iranian position; take Mr. Larijani seriously when he proposes an international consortium to enrich uranium in Iran.

Realism demands that we admit that the acquisition of the nuclear know-how desired by the Shah has occurred. The installations can certainly be destroyed, but it will not be possible to eliminate tens of thousands of human competencies. That knowledge will have to be inserted into a partnership subject to rigorous verification procedures. As the historic opportunity to exit from a global crisis emerges, who would dare bear responsibility for having deliberately lost it?

François Géré is president of the French Institute for Strategic Analysis (Ifas) and author of "L'Iran et le nucléaire" ["Iran and the Nuclear Issue"].