Friday, March 14, 2008

Iranians vote amid concern about US aggression and falling living standards

By Peter Symonds
World Socialist Web Site, 14/03/08


Iranian voters go to the polls today to choose a new majlis or parliament in a stunted election in which more than 2,000 candidates have been disqualified from standing. Official campaigning lasted just one week and debate has been narrowly confined to differences between the "conservatives" and "reformers"—competing wings of the existing political establishment.


The "victory" of conservatives is a forgone conclusion as most prominent reformers were excluded in the vetting process carried out by the Interior Ministry and the unelected, 12-member Guardian Council appointed by the country’s supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei. Reformers grouped around former President Mohammad Khatami and the allied National Confidence Party of cleric Mehdi Karroubi have candidates in less than half of the 290 seats and are only expected to win around 50.

The conservative camp, however, is divided between supporters and critics of President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad. All describe themselves as "principalists"—hard-line defenders of the theocratic state established after the 1979 Iranian revolution—and oppose the limited democratic reforms and accommodation with the major powers advocated by Khamenei and his allies. Figures like former top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and current Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf have been increasingly critical of Ahmadinejad’s populist rhetoric, both in the confrontation with Washington over Iran’s nuclear programs and on economic politics that have helped fuel skyrocketting inflation.

The Bush administration’s threats of military action against Iran are a major factor in the election. Khamenei and his supporters have exploited Washington’s aggressive stance to justify the marginalisation of the reformers and brand any, even limited, criticism of the regime as tantamount to treason. In comments on Wednesday, Khamenei urged voters to support "whoever our enemies do not want to be in parliament". Anyone "who our enemies want" in parliament, he said, "will only implement the enemy’s agenda".

The remarks followed sharp attacks on two leading reformers. Khatami’s brother was denounced for meeting with the German ambassador prior to the latest round of UN Security Council sanctions on Iran and Noureddine Pir Mouazaem was condemned for giving an interview on US-funded Voice of America television critical of the disqualification of candidates. Announcing an official investigation into Mouazaem’s interview, Intelligence Minister Gholam Hossein Mohseni Ejeie declared that "this has definitely been treason and an appalling act".

The other issue dominating the election is the economy and widespread disaffection over the rising cost of living. The year-on-year inflation figure hit 19.2 percent in February and the cost of essential items, including food and housing, has risen sharply. In a bid to appease popular anger, the government has lowered tariffs on some imported goods, begun distributing eggs, chicken, and meat at lower prices, and plans to ease petrol rationing to allow more people to travel during the Iranian New Year on March 20.

While Ahmadinejad blames UN sanctions for the price rises, his critics point to his populist policies, including handouts during his frequent visits to drum up support in regional areas, the lowering of interest rates and high public spending. Former Ahmadinejad loyalist and adviser Mohammad Khoshchehreh recently accused the president of failing to have any economic plans. "He wants to run the country with charity projects, like giving out loans," he said. All the factions appeal to voters by hypocritically declaring, "we feel your pain", but their economic prescriptions will only deepen the divide between rich and poor.

Despite the sometimes bitter exchanges, the political differences between the factions are narrow. All defend the current theocratic state and the capitalist economy on which it rests. Their tactical disagreements represent the interests of competing layers of the Iranian capitalist class. Significantly, none of the reformers have publicly opposed the arrest of more than 40 left-wing students in December and January.

The conservatives are linked to layers of the Shiite clergy and the state apparatus, particularly the armed forces and Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corp (IRGC), whose privileges, power and substantial business interests depend on the maintenance of the status quo. The reformers, on the other hand, have been pressing for an easing of tensions with the major powers and limited democratic reforms in order to integrate the Iranian economy more closely into globalised production processes and attract foreign investment.

Khatami won the presidency in 1997 by appealing to widespread sentiment, particularly among young people, for democratic rights, jobs and improved living standards. During his eight years in office, however, the reformers suffered a dramatic decline in support. Khatami’s administration repeatedly compromised and backed down in the face of vicious crackdowns by religious hardliners on oppositionists and the liberal press. His attempts to reach an accommodation with the Western powers were stymied by Washington and his pro-market policies only heightened the social crisis confronting working people.

Broken promises

Ahmadinejad won the 2005 election, defeating the favoured conservative candidate, Ayatollah Ali Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani, by making demagogic pledges to lift living standards and opposing Washington’s bullying of Iran over its nuclear programs. However, as the economic crisis has continued and deepened, Ahmadinejad’s popularity has slid. In December 2006 local council elections, his supporters suffered a serious setback, winning only 3 of 15 council seats in Tehran, where Ahmadinejad had been the mayor.

As popular hostility has deepened, former conservative allies have distanced themselves from Ahmadinejad. Economic analyst Amir Hossain Rasael told the Washington Post: "We are making record profits, but the economy is in its worst state ever. The president changed all government managers with inexperienced young people. Inflation is far over 20 percent, there are no foreign investments, and prices of housing and food have gone through the roof. Politicians don’t want to take the blame for this."

All factions are manoeuvring in preparation for next year’s presidential election. If Ahmadinejad’s supporters in the United Fundamentalist Front fare badly, his conservative critics in the Inclusive Fundamentalist Coalition such as Ali Larijani, who has close ties to the supreme leader, and Tehran mayor Qalibaf may be encouraged to challenge him. Former President Khatami, who has been actively campaigning for reformers, is also under pressure to stand. The presidency has executive powers, while the parliament has relatively limited authority. Both can be overridden by Khamenei, as the unelected supreme leader.

Amid widespread alienation from the political establishment as a whole, there have been fears in ruling circles that a low voter turnout would undermine the legitimacy of the poll. At the last parliamentary election in 2004, the participation rate dropped to just 50.5 percent, down from the previous 67.4 percent. In Tehran, only 2 million of the 8 million eligible voters went to the polls. Senior officials and the state-run media have been campaigning hard to avoid a repetition of the 2004 turnout.

In a bid to scotch a boycott by reformers, Khamenei publicly denounced all those supporting such a move as being "either fooled or supported by foreign interests". Khatami and other most reformers quickly fell into line and issued statements calling for their supporters to vote. Their refusal to mount a determined challenge to their political rivals is in part conditioned by a concern that Khamenei could exploit a boycott to bar reformist candidates from standing for the presidency next year.

More fundamentally, all the factions fear that any protest movement may rapidly spiral out of control. A significant element of Mohammad Khoshchehreh’s criticisms of Ahmadinejad is that his populism will only lead to dashed expectations and widespread anger. "People’s hope grows like a bubble when politicians give populist promises," he said. "But if these hopes are not materialised, the bubble bursts and the consequences are disastrous."

International media coverage of the Iranian election has been limited and slanted against Ahmadinejad, but occasional interviews have provided some glimpses of popular sentiment.

A shopkeeper in a low-income neighbourhood told the Financial Times: "This parliament didn’t do anything for us. They lined their pockets while high prices are suffocating people. Young people can’t even get married these days because they can’t afford the rent on an apartment."

Maryam Fadai told Reuters that she felt betrayed by Ahmadinejad and was going to vote for his conservative rivals. "I voted for Ahmadinejad, but nothing changed... I will vote for Qalibaf’s group... I want some changes in my life. I feel cheated because I voted for conservatives to have a better life. Did I get it?" She works two jobs—in a factory in the morning and clearing houses in the afternoon—to make ends meet.

Speaking to the BBC, Farhad, an engineer in Tehran, was disgusted with the blatantly discriminatory disqualification of candidates. "I want to vote for democratic and secular candidates. But finding them in the present political system would be a miracle. I think the election will mark another step in Ayatollah Khamenei’s attempt to make the political system more uniform and to reinforce his own theocracy...

"Inflation is out of control and has affected every aspect of life in Iran. International sanctions make the situation worse, especially in healthcare. Vital drugs which used to be imported are now hard to find," he said.

An article in Reuters pointed to widespread disaffection among students. Some had decided not to vote. Others, responding to the government’s campaign, said they were going to do their civic duty, but were not enthusiastic about any of the candidates. One activist Ali Nikounesbati told the news agency: "Students have made no move to boycott the election, but the general atmosphere is cold."

Despite the carefully managed character of the election, the deep going frustration, alienation and hostility may yet produce some political surprises. Whatever the immediate outcome, the regime’s inability to meet the aspirations of ordinary working people for democratic rights and decent living standards foreshadows sharp political convulsions ahead.

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Thursday, March 13, 2008

Iran's Orchestrated Elections

By Ray Takeyh
International Herald Tribune, 13/03/08


As the results of Iran’s parliamentary election on Friday unfold, there will be much speculation about its impact on President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad and his tumultuous tenure. However, the underlying story has less to do with Ahmadinejad than with the triumph of Supreme Leader Ali Khamenei’s long-term strategy of ensuring a conservative consolidation of power. Khamenei stands unchallenged at the top of the Islamic Republic, with a verdict that has only reinforced his claims of political hegemony.


It is customary to suggest that Khamenei has followed the lead of his illustrious predecessor, Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, in balancing Iran’s various factions. The idea does have merit, as the participation of all political groups in the critical decision-making process would distribute the burden of any failed initiative on all the relevant national parties. To be sure, Khomeini was inclusive and was open to suggestions and dissent from all segments of the ruling elite.

The only problem with this narrative is that it does not adequately represent how Khamenei has comported himself. During the past two decades, the ayatollah has methodically undermined all contenders to his rule and all challengers to his preferred conservative allies.

By temperament and design, Khamenei has always been cautious and conservative, uneasy about radical solutions and self-defeating crusades. The Supreme Leader is one of the few Iranians that perceive the Islamic Republic as an attractive polity with no real need for reform or rejuvenation. Upon assumption of power in 1989, he moved to align himself with the reactionary elements in their quest to undermine President Hashemi Rafsanjani’s attempt to usher in a more pragmatic approach to statecraft.

In a pattern that would often repeat itself, the hard-liners employed their institutional power to thwart reform measures. Under the auspices of Khamenei, the hard-liners systematically undermined Rafsanjani’s initiatives to liberalize the economy and reach out to the international community.

It is no secret that Khamenei preferred the reliably reactionary Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri for the presidency in 1997. The election of Nateq-Nuri would have completed the conservatives’ institutional dominance, as all the relevant national organs would be manned by Khamenei loyalists. Even Iran’s circumscribed political process, however, can produce surprising results, as the Iranian masses chose to empower the most serious challenge to Khamenei—Muhammad Khatami and the reform movement.

Alas, the reform interlude was not to last long. With the Supreme Leader’s blessing, the conservatives cynically deployed the judiciary and the security services to close down newspapers and imprison key reform figures on contrived charges, while the Guardian Council systematically voided parliamentary legislation.

By the 2005 presidential election, Khamenei’s long-term strategy of conservative predominance seemed complete, as Ahmadinejad triumphed over the aged and corrupt Rafsanjani. Although Ahmadinejad’s electoral pledge of social justice has garnered much attention, he also promised to abide by the strictures and fiats of the Supreme Leader. Despite predictable ebbs and flows, the relationship between the two men has remained intimate. To be sure, Ahmadinejad’s incendiary rhetoric and lack of coherent economic planning may disturb the Supreme Leader, but he remains loyal to the president.

Khamenei has not reached the pinnacle of power by remaining complacent about potential challenges. By encouraging younger rivals to Ahmadinejad, such as the former nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani and Tehran’s mayor, Muhammad Qalibaf, he can maintain his options and keep the president on a short leash. Unlike the old guard—such as Rafsanjani and Khatami—the younger conservatives do not have an independent powerbase or sufficient stature to contest the Supreme Leader’s prerogatives. Under Khamenei’s direction, the Guardian Council has been careful to exclude reformers and pragmatists from serious contention for parliamentary seats, leaving assorted conservatives to battle it out among themselves. The ensuing Parliament is likely to be dominated by politicians who require Khamenei’s approbation for their political viability.

Khamenei’s nearly two-decade strategy of ensuring his political primacy has finally been realized. In a remarkable achievement, he has managed to marginalize the wily Rafsanjani and the still-popular Khatami. The future of Iran belongs to the Supreme Leader and dogmatic younger conservatives who outdo one another for his support and affection. Whatever the composition of the new Parliament, and whoever succeeds the office of the presidency next year, Iran has entered the age when a single mullah dominates all institutions and arbitrates all debates. Iran’s Supreme Leader has never been more supreme.

Ray Takeyh, Senior Fellow for Middle Eastern Studies

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Tuesday, March 11, 2008

Outcome of Iranian election points to simmering popular discontent

By Peter Symonds
World Socialist Web Site, 11/03/08


Counting in last Friday’s parliamentary election in Iran is still to be finalised, but the main trends are clear. The conservatives, also known as principalists for their hard-line defence of the country’s theocratic state, will again dominate the majlis or national assembly. The reformers, who advocate limited democratic reforms, an accommodation with the major powers and economic restructuring, will retain a small parliamentary presence despite the disqualification of many of their leading contenders prior to the poll.


A great deal of attention focussed on the overall vote, amid fears in the political establishment that many people, disgusted with all factions, would simply not participate. Supreme leader Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, senior government officials and the state-run media pulled out all stops, urging people to vote as their patriotic duty to counter international criticism of the election. In a bid to maximise the numbers, polling hours were extended late into the night last Friday.

The nervousness in ruling circles was evident in the speed with which the Interior Ministry announced the initial results on Sunday: a win for the conservatives and a turnout of more than 60 percent. Supreme leader Khamenei immediately hailed the outcome, declaring: "Once again, your glorious and powerful presence in the election foiled enemies’ plots. Their psychological war to make a low turnout was no more than an empty bubble."

While higher than the all-time low of 50.5 percent in 2004, the overall vote last Friday was still well below previous parliamentary elections. In Tehran, the official figure was only 40 percent. Critics have suggested that even these results were doctored. Economist Fariborz Raisdana told the Telegraph that the overall turnout was likely to have been only 35 percent. "This is not a true election. They hold it because they want to show off to the world and persuade people they are democratic," he said.

Whatever the actual turnout, there is undoubtedly widespread alienation and dissatisfaction over the lack of basic democratic rights, skyrocketting inflation and high levels of unemployment. Ahmadinejad won the 2005 presidential election by making populist promises to help the poor and pledging to take a tough stance against the Bush administration’s menacing threats over Iran’s nuclear programs. He was able to capitalise on disaffection with his predecessor, the reformist Mohammed Khatami, who had failed to implement democratic reforms in the face of hard-line opposition and presided over declining living standards produced by his free market policies.

According to the Interior Ministry, the conservatives won 71 percent of seats so far decided in last Friday’s poll. Ahmadinejad’s supporters claimed the outcome as a victory, but there are divisions even within the conservative camp. Those backing the president ran on list for the United Principalist Front, while conservatives critical of his handling of the economy and his abrasive foreign policy stood for the Broad Principalist Coalition.

According to the Mehr news agency, the United Principalist Front won 88 seats and the Broad Principalist Coalition 75 seats. Two reform groups—Khatami’s supporters and Etemad-e Meli—gained 23 and 17 seats respectively. Some 49 "independents" were also elected. The remainder of the 290 seats will be decided in a second round of voting next month.

All of these figures, however, are approximate. Other reports put the number of finalised seats at only 204. Moreover, who is counted in which camp is confused by the indistinct character of the coalitions and the fact that a large number of candidates stood on multiple lists. Amir Ali Amiri, the coalition coordinator for the Broad Principalists, claimed that his group would have 80 seats, but only 32 of those successful candidates had stood solely for that list.

The reformers are claiming a victory simply because their faction will have a similar number of seats as in the previous parliament—40. Reformist politician Mohammad Ali Abtahi told the media: "The important message for us was that it was the right decision not to back down after the mass rejection of prominent reformist candidates and stay in the race. We managed to mess up their plans." In fact, the decision to stand, rather than mount a boycott to protest the disqualifications, reflected the unwillingness of the reformers to mount any serious political challenge to the dominant conservative factions.

The validity of the vote, particularly in Tehran, has been questioned. Various figures have been reported for the seats decided in the capital—from 14 to 24 out of a total of 30, with the remainder to be decided in the second round. All of the seats, however, have gone to Ahmadinejad’s supporters with none being won by reformers or rival conservatives. An editorial in National Confidence, a pro-reformist newspaper, asked: "How it can be that reformists won 30 percent of the seats in rural areas, but [none so far] in the capital where reformists enjoy more media support?"

Tehran is also the base of support for Tehran mayor Mohammad Baqer Qalibaf, who, along with former top nuclear negotiator Ali Larijani, are key figures in the Broad Principalist Coalition. Qalibaf swept to power in Tehran in nationwide local elections in 2006, exploiting deep discontent among working people over deteriorating living standards. The official inflation rate is nearly 20 percent, with the cost of basic food items and housing rising sharply. While fuel prices are still low, the government imposed unpopular rationing last year in a bid to rein in the cost of subsidies.

The election outcome sets the stage for the presidential poll due next year. The strong showing by Ali Larijani, who won a seat with 76 percent of the vote in the holy city of Qom, places him in a strong position if he decides to challenge Ahmadinejad for the presidency. Qalibaf is also positioning himself as a possible contender for the post. All of these calculations, however, depend on factors that are beyond the control of Ahmadinejad or his potential rivals.

All of the factions in Tehran are no doubt watching the US election very closely. Larijani, in particular, may be calculating that a new US administration would be more amenable to an easing of relations with Iran. While he has played down any fundamental differences with Ahmadinejad over nuclear policy, Larijani has been critical of the president’s rhetoric as unnecessarily antagonistic to the major powers. At the same time, US President Bush has not ruled out the option of using military force against Iran and is quite capable of launching such an attack in his remaining months in office—a move that would dramatically alter the political equation in Tehran.

Any downturn in the world economy will inevitably impact on Iran producing a further decline in what for many are already intolerable conditions. In such conditions, Ahmadinejad’s already tattered image as the man of the people who promised to put oil money on everyone’s table would rapidly disintegrate. All of his rivals, however, are advancing economic policies that would rein in government spending and deepen the gulf between rich and poor.

The results of the stage-managed election in Iran only serve to underscore the narrow range of opinion represented in the political establishment in which support for Iranian capitalism and the theocratic state that emerged from the 1979 revolution are mandatory. All factions are acutely aware that the simmering popular discontent that found so little expression in last Friday’s poll will not go away and has the potential to erupt in unexpected forms.

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Tuesday, March 4, 2008

Putin-Medvedev tandem wins presidential election in Russia

By Vladimir Volkov
World Socialist Web Site, 04/03/08


The presidential elections held March 2 in Russia ended, as expected, in a victory for the tandem made up of the departing president, Vladimir Putin, and the former vice premier, Dmitry Medvedev.

Medvedev, the Kremlin’s main candidate, personally chosen by Putin as his successor and supported by the administrative, financial and media resources of the authoritarian Russian regime, won in the first round of voting by a wide margin over three other candidates.

According to data from the Central Election Committee, with 99.5 percent of the ballots counted Medvedev had won 70.23 percent of the votes; Gennady Zyuganov, leader of the Communist Party, had won 17.76 percent; the head of the right-wing nationalist Liberal-Democratic Party, Vladimir Zhirinovsky, had obtained 9.37 percent; and the leader of the tiny Democratic Party, Andrei Bogdanov, had polled 1.29 percent.

Voter turnout was 69.61 percent, a bit lower than the previous presidential election in 2004. But the Kremlin deemed the overall result sufficient to provide the appearance of legitimacy in the transfer of presidential power.

The election campaign took place under conditions of gross violations of elementary democratic procedures, similar to those which occurred in the parliamentary (Duma) elections held last December. In the earlier elections, the victory of the Kremlin-bureaucratic party "United Russia" was achieved with the aid of "administrative resources" and fraud.

In several regions the number of those voting in December reached nearly 100 percent, and in some places the official turnout even exceeded the maximum possible. At the conclusion of the elections to the Duma, nearly 200 of the 450 newly elected deputies handed over their mandates to other people. In their stead, deputy governors, mayors and other representatives, for whom no one had voted, became deputies.

The parliamentary elections were declared "a vote of confidence in Putin," and the subsequent propaganda campaign was built around the proposition that the Russian people had already "made their choice," which now had simply to be formalized with regard to the presidential candidate who had been selected by Putin.

The procedure of nominating and registering candidates for president in Russia at the present time is both repressive and forbidding, making it practically impossible for a figure who is not approved by the authorities to appear on the ballot.

Some three weeks were allocated for nominating candidates, during which time a prospective candidate had to prepare and conduct a meeting of no less than 500 citizens. One of the leaders of the liberal opposition, former world chess champion Garry Kasparov, was not able to hold such a meeting because the administrative building where space had been rented suddenly annulled the contract. Kasparov, who has no problems with money, was not able to find another place in Moscow, and was forced to cancel his candidacy.

The second stage was the gathering of 2 million signatures nationwide, which had to be accomplished by the middle of January. The first two weeks of the new year in Russia are holidays, and many people spend the time at home or on vacation.

It is virtually impossible to gather the required number of signatures within the designated period. As a result, the election lists submitted are, for the most part, fake, allowing the authorities to disqualify candidates they consider to be unsuitable.

That is what happened with Mikhail Kasyanov, who was the premier during Putin’s first term as president in 2000-2004, and who now is one of the main representatives of the liberal opposition. Retaining his old authority in the state apparatus, and enjoying the support of big business, Kasyanov is viewed by the Kremlin as a dangerous opponent.

The Central Election Committee found that around 15 percent of his ballot papers were invalid, while the allowed number is 5 percent.

On the other hand, the election committee ruled that Andrei Bogdanov, a candidate supported by the Kremlin as a lure for the liberally inclined electorate, passed muster with only 3 percent invalid signatures. The party headed by Bogdanov had received a total of 90,000 votes in the parliamentary elections. This did not prevent him from collecting the necessary signatures to run for president-a number more than twenty times the votes his party had just received.

Medvedev’s election campaign was, in fact, an undertaking conducted by the state apparatus. His staff was run by the head of the president’s administration, Sergei Sobyanin, and the heads of the majority of regional staffs were deputy governors. The first conference of the leaders of Medvedev’s regional headquarters was held in the building that houses the Russian president’s offices on Moscow’s Old Square-the bastion of the former Soviet bureaucracy.

Medvedev refused to appear personally at the reception held for the candidate’s registration certification, even though he was in Moscow. He also refused to participate in the television debates.

He conducted his entire campaign while remaining at the post of vice premier and repeatedly appearing in public with President Putin. He participated in several important international meetings, in particular, the signing of the pact with Serbia on the construction of gas pipeline branches for the "South Stream."

The amount of television coverage Medvedev enjoyed was three times greater than that of all the other candidates, whose television debates were broadcast early in the morning and late at night.

All of this was calculated to convince the voters that Medvedev was not a candidate competing against others, but rather the inevitable winner for whom there was no alternative.

The final trump card employed by the Kremlin was the formation within the Central Election Committee, five days before the election, of a so-called "working group." Members of this body, which was not provided for by law, were limited to representatives of the ruling party, United Russia. The "working group" was given the exclusive right to count and verify the actual ballots.

All of these efforts produced the desired results. Even without them, Medvedev might have won by a substantial margin. However, the Kremlin higher-ups understand well that the real moods in society are replete with feelings of dissatisfaction which could find sudden expression if the bulldog grip from above were relaxed.

An important factor in realizing the Kremlin’s plans was the political prostration of all of the other political forces and their readiness to accept the rules of the game as dictated from above.

None of the parties of official Russian politics-be they liberals or Russian nationalists-represent the interests of the workers. They serve instead as instruments in the hands of one or another layer of the ruling oligarchy and upper bureaucracy. They fear the growing discontent from below more than the humiliation they receive at the hands of the authoritarian Kremlin powers.

Medvedev’s election campaign proceeded under the slogan of "continuing Putin’s course," and was accompanied by a flood of demagogy and lies. Using favorable macroeconomic indicators and the strengthened position of Russian capitalism on the international arena-as a result of the vast inflation in energy prices-Medvedev and Putin claimed that their economic "success" benefited not only the upper crust, but also wide layers of society.

Thus, in speaking last month at a session of the State Council, Putin declared: "We must free the country from the vicious practice of making state decisions under the pressure of natural resource and finance monopolies, of media magnates, foreign political circles and unbridled populists, where not only the national interest, but the elementary demands of millions of people are cynically ignored."

Meanwhile, a central result of Putin’s rule has been a vast growth in social inequality and the impoverishment of significant layers of society.

In an opinion piece in the March 3 edition of the government newspaper Russian Gazette, Evgeny Gontmakher, head of the Center of Social Policy at the Institute of Economics of the Russian Academy of Science, wrote that "the quality of life has declined for the majority of the population (even those considered moderately well-off)."

"Thus, in particular," he continued, "quality health care and education to an ever greater extent must be paid for. In addition, people are forced to pay unofficially. As a result, only 15-20 percent of the population are able to maintain their health at a decent level and give their children a competitive education... The rest are forced to vegetate."

Gontmakher noted one more "troubling fact:" the ratio of the average pension to the average wage in Russia is constantly decreasing, and has now fallen to less than 25 percent, where the minimum norm is 40 percent.

In contrast, the Russian oligarchs are becoming ever wealthier. The journal Finance, in its yearly survey, noted that in one year the wealth of Oleg Deripaska, the most successful Russian businessman, almost doubled, and has reached $40 billion. In recent years, the number of dollar billionaires in Russia has almost doubled-from 61 to 101 people.

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