Putin's Ruthless Gambit

The Bush Administration Falters in a Geopolitical Chess Match

By Michael T. Klare
TomDispatch, 02/09/08

Many Western analysts have chosen to interpret the recent fighting in the Caucasus as the onset of a new Cold War, with a small pro-Western democracy bravely resisting a brutal reincarnation of Stalin's jack-booted Soviet Union. Others have viewed it a throwback to the age-old ethnic politics of southeastern Europe, with assorted minorities using contemporary border disputes to settle ancient scores.

Neither of these explanations is accurate. To fully grasp the recent upheavals in the Caucasus, it is necessary to view the conflict as but a minor skirmish in a far more significant geopolitical struggle between Moscow and Washington over the energy riches of the Caspian Sea basin-with former Russian President (now Prime Minister) Vladimir Putin emerging as the reigning Grand Master of geostrategic chess and the Bush team turning out to be middling amateurs, at best.

The ultimate prize in this contest is control over the flow of oil and natural gas from the energy-rich Caspian basin to eager markets in Europe and Asia. According to the most recent tally by oil giant BP, the Caspian's leading energy producers, all former "socialist republics" of the Soviet Union-notably Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan-together possess approximately 48 billion barrels in proven oil reserves (roughly equivalent to those left in the U.S. and Canada) and 268 trillion cubic feet of natural gas (essentially equivalent to what Saudi Arabia possesses).

During the Soviet era, the oil and gas output of these nations was, of course, controlled by officials in Moscow and largely allocated to Russia and other Soviet republics. After the breakup of the USSR in 1991, however, Western oil companies began to participate in the hydrocarbon equivalent of a gold rush to exploit Caspian energy reservoirs, while plans were being made to channel the region's oil and gas to markets across the world.

Rush to the Caspian

In the 1990s, the Caspian Sea basin was viewed as the world's most promising new source of oil and gas, and so the major Western energy firms-Chevron, BP, Shell, and Exxon Mobil, among others-rushed into the region to take advantage of what seemed a golden opportunity. For these firms, persuading the governments of the newly independent Caspian states to sign deals proved to be no great hassle. They were eager to attract Western investment-and the bribes that often came with it-and to free themselves from Moscow's economic domination.

But there turned out to be a major catch: It was neither obvious nor easy to figure out how to move all the new oil and gas to markets in the West. After all, the Caspian is landlocked, so tankers cannot get near it, while all existing pipelines passed through Russia and were hooked into Soviet-era supply systems. While many in Washington were eager to assist U.S. firms in their drive to gain access to Caspian energy, they did not want to see the resulting oil and gas flow through Russia-until recently, the country's leading adversary-before reaching Western markets.

What, then, to do? Looking at the Caspian chessboard in the mid-1990s, President Bill Clinton conceived the striking notion of converting the newly independent, energy-poor Republic of Georgia into an "energy corridor" for the export of Caspian basin oil and gas to the West, thereby bypassing Russia altogether. An initial, "early-oil" pipeline was built to carry petroleum from newly-developed fields in Azerbaijan's sector of the Caspian Sea to Supsa on Georgia's Black Sea coast, where it was loaded onto tankers for delivery to international markets. This would be followed by a far more audacious scheme: the construction of the 1,000-mile BTC pipeline from Baku in Azerbaijan to Tbilisi in Georgia and then on to Ceyhan on Turkey's Mediterranean coast. Again, the idea was to exclude Russia-which had, in the intervening years, been transformed into a struggling, increasingly impoverished former superpower-from the Caspian Sea energy rush.

Clinton presided over every stage of the BTC line's initial development, from its early conception to the formal arrangements imposed by Washington on the three nations involved in its corporate structuring. (Final work on the pipeline was not completed until 2006, two years into George W. Bush's second term.) For Clinton and his advisors, this was geopolitics, pure and simple-a calculated effort to enhance Western energy security while diminishing Moscow's control over the global flow of oil and gas. The administration's efforts to promote the construction of new pipelines through Azerbaijan and Georgia were intended "to break Russia's monopoly of control over the transportation of oil from the region," Sheila Heslin of the National Security Council bluntly told a Senate investigating committee in 1997.
Clinton understood that this strategy entailed significant risks, particularly because Washington's favored "energy corridor" passed through or near several major conflict zones-including the Russian-backed breakaway enclaves of Abkhazia and South Ossetia. With this in mind, Clinton made a secondary decision-to convert the new Georgian army into a military proxy of the United States, quipped and trained by the Department of Defense. From 1998 to 2000 alone, Georgia was awarded $302 million in U.S. military and economic aid-more than any other Caspian country-and top U.S. military officials started making regular trips to its capital, Tbilisi, to demonstrate support for then-president Eduard Shevardnadze.

In those years, Clinton was the top chess player in the Caspian region, while his Russian presidential counterpart, Boris Yeltsin, was far too preoccupied with domestic troubles and a bitter, costly, ongoing guerrilla war in Chechnya to match his moves. It was clear, however, that senior Russian officials were deeply concerned by the growing U.S. presence in their southern backyard-what they called their "near abroad"-and had already had begun planning for an eventual comeback. "It hasn't been left unnoticed in Russia that certain outside interests are trying to weaken our position in the Caspian basin," Andrei Y. Urnov of the Russian Ministry of Foreign Affairs declared in May 2000. "No one should be perplexed that Russia is determined to resist the attempts to encroach on her interests."

Russia Resurgent

At this critical moment, a far more capable player took over on Russia's side of the geopolitical chessboard. On December 31, 1999, Vladimir V. Putin was appointed president by Yeltsin and then, on March 26, 2000, elected to a full four-year term in office. Politics in the Caucasus and the Caspian region have never been the same.

Even before assuming the presidency, Putin indicated that he believed state control over energy resources should be the basis for Russia's return to great-power status. In his doctoral dissertation, a summary of which was published in 1999, he had written that "[t]he state has the right to regulate the process of the acquisition and the use of natural resources, and particularly mineral resources [including oil and natural gas], independent of on whose property they are located." On this basis, Putin presided over the re-nationalization of many of the energy companies that had been privatized by Yeltsin and the virtual confiscation of Yukos-once Russia's richest private energy firm-by Russian state authorities. He also brought Gazprom, the world's largest natural gas supplier, back under state control and placed a protégé, Dmitri Medvedev-now president of Russia-at its helm.
Once he had restored state control over the lion's share of Russia's oil and gas resources, Putin turned his attention to the next obvious place-the Caspian Sea basin. Here, his intent was not so much to gain ownership of its energy resources-although Russian firms have in recent years acquired an equity share in some Caspian oil and gas fields-but rather to dominate the export conduits used to transport its energy to Europe and Asia.

Russia already enjoyed a considerable advantage since much of Kazakhstan's oil already flowed to the West via the Caspian Pipeline Consortium (CPC), which passes through Russia before terminating on the Black Sea; moreover, much of Central Asia's natural gas continued to flow to Russia through pipelines built during the Soviet era. But Putin's gambit in the Caspian region evidently was meant to capture a far more ambitious prize. He wanted to ensure that most oil and gas from newly developed fields in the Caspian basin would travel west via Russia.

The first part of this drive entailed frenzied diplomacy by Putin and Medvedev (still in his role as board chairman of Gazprom) to persuade the presidents of Kazakhstan, Turkmenistan, and Uzbekistan to ship their future output of gas through Russia. Success was achieved when, in December 2007, Putin signed an agreement with the leaders of these countries to supply 20 billion cubic meters of gas per year through a new conduit along the Caspian's eastern shore to southern Russia-for ultimate delivery to Europe via Gazprom's existing pipeline network.

Meanwhile, Putin moved to undermine international confidence in Georgia as a reliable future corridor for energy delivery. This became a strategic priority for Moscow because the European Union announced plans to build a $10 billion natural-gas pipeline from the Caspian, dubbed Nabucco" after the opera by Verdi. It would run from Turkey to Austria, while linking up to an expanded South Caucasus gas pipeline that now extends from Azerbaijan through Georgia to Erzurum in Turkey. The Nabucco pipeline was intended as a dramatic move to reduce Europe's reliance on Russian natural gas-and so has enjoyed strong support from the Bush administration.
It is against this backdrop that the recent events in Georgia unfolded.

Checkmate in Georgia

Obviously, the more oil and gas passing through Georgia on its way to the West, the greater that country's geostrategic significance in the U.S.-Russian struggle over the distribution of Caspian energy. Certainly, the Bush administration recognized this and responded by providing hundreds of millions of dollars in military aid to the Georgian military and helping to train specialized forces for protection of the new pipelines. But the administration's partner in Tbilisi, President Mikheil Saakashvili, was not content to play the relatively modest role of pipeline protector. Instead, he sought to pursue a megalomaniacal fantasy of recapturing the breakaway regions of Abhkazia and South Ossetia with American help. As it happened, the Bush team-blindsided by their own neoconservative fantasies-saw in Saakashvili a useful pawn in their pursuit of a long smoldering anti-Russian agenda. Together, they walked into a trap cleverly set by Putin.

It is hard not to conclude that Russian prime minister goaded the rash Saakashvili into invading South Ossetia by encouraging Abkhazian and South Ossetian irregulars to attack Georgian outposts and villages on the peripheries of the two enclaves. Secretary of State Condoleezza Rice reportedly told Saakashvili not to respond to such provocations when she met with him in July. Apparently her advice fell on deaf ears. Far more enticing, it seems, was her promise of strong U.S. backing for Georgia's rapid entry into NATO. Other American leaders, including Senator John McCain, assured Saakashvili of unwavering U.S. support. Whatever was said in these private conversations, the Georgian president seems to have interpreted them as a green light for his adventuristic impulses. On August 7th, by all accounts, his forces invaded South Ossetia and attacked its capital city of Tskhinvali, giving Putin what he long craved-a seemingly legitimate excuse to invade Georgia and demonstrate the complete vulnerability of Clinton's (and now Bush's) vaunted energy corridor.

Today, the Georgian army is in shambles, the BTC and South Caucasus gas pipelines are within range of Russian firepower, and Abkhazia and South Ossetia have declared their independence, quickly receiving Russian recognition. In response to these developments, the Bush administration has, along with some friendly leaders in Europe, mounted a media and diplomatic counterattack, accusing Moscow of barbaric behavior and assorted violations of international law. Threats have also been made to exclude Russia from various international forums and institutions, such as the G-8 club of governments and the World Trade Organization. It is possible, then, that Moscow will suffer some isolation and inconvenience as a result of its incursion into Georgia.

None of this, so far as can be determined, will alter the picture in the Caucasus: Putin has moved his most powerful pieces onto this corner of the chessboard, America's pawn has been decisively defeated, and there's not much of a practical nature that Washington (or London or Paris or Berlin) can do to alter the outcome.

There will, of course, be more rounds to come, and it is impossible to predict how they will play out. Putin prevailed this time around because he focused on geopolitical objectives, while his opponents were blindly driven by fantasy and ideology; so long as this pattern persists, he or his successors are likely to come out on top. Only if American leaders assume a more realistic approach to Russia's resurgent power or, alternatively, choose to collaborate with Moscow in the exploitation of Caspian energy, will the risk of further strategic setbacks in the region disappear.

Michael T. Klare is professor of peace and world security studies at Hampshire College and the author, most recently, of Rising Powers, Shrinking Planet: The New Geopolitics of Energy (Metropolitan Books).

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Israel of the Caucasus

By Arnaud De Borchgrave
United Press International, 02/09/08

For Russia, the geopolitical stars were in perfect alignment. The United States was badly overstretched and had no plausible way to talk tough without coming across as empty rhetoric. American resources have been drained by the Iraq and Afghan wars, and the war on terror. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov put it, Washington must now choose between its "pet project" Georgia and a partnership with Moscow.

Georgian President Mikheil Saakashvili evidently thought the United States would come to his side militarily if Russian troops pushed him back into Georgia after ordering an attack last Aug. 8 on the breakaway province of South Ossetia. And when his forces were mauled by Russia's counterattack, bitter disappointment turned to anger. Along with Abkhazia, Georgia lost two provinces.

Georgia also had a special relationship with Israel that was mostly under the radar. Georgian Defense Minister Davit Kezerashvili is a former Israeli who moved things along by facilitating Israeli arms sales with U.S. aid. "We are now in a fight against the great Russia," he was quoted as saying, "and our hope is to receive assistance from the White House because Georgia cannot survive on its own."

The Jerusalem Post on Aug. 12 reported, "Georgian Prime Minister Vladimir Gurgenidze made a special call to Israel Tuesday morning to receive a blessing from one of the Haredi community's most important rabbis and spiritual leaders, Rabbi Aaron Leib Steinman. 'I want him to pray for us and our state,'" he was quoted.

Israel began selling arms to Georgia seven years ago. U.S. grants facilitated these purchases. From Israel came former minister and former Tel Aviv Mayor Roni Milo, representing Elbit Systems, and his brother Shlomo, former director general of Military Industries. Israeli UAV spy drones, made by Elbit Maarahot Systems, conducted recon flights over southern Russia, as well as into nearby Iran.

In a secret agreement between Israel and Georgia, two military airfields in southern Georgia had been earmarked for the use of Israeli fighter-bombers in the event of pre-emptive attacks against Iranian nuclear installations. This would sharply reduce the distance Israeli fighter-bombers would have to fly to hit targets in Iran. And to reach Georgian airstrips, the Israeli air force would fly over Turkey.

The attack ordered by Saakashvili against South Ossetia the night of Aug. 7 provided the Russians the pretext for Moscow to order Special Forces to raid these Israeli facilities where some Israeli drones were reported captured.

At a Moscow news conference, Gen. Anatoly Nogovitsyn, Russia's deputy chief of staff, said the extent of Israeli aid to Georgia included "eight types of military vehicles, explosives, landmines and special explosives for clearing minefields." Estimated numbers of Israeli trainers attached to the Georgian army range from 100 to 1,000. There were also 110 U.S. military personnel on training assignments in Georgia. Last July 2,000 U.S. troops were flown in for "Immediate Response 2008," a joint exercise with Georgian forces.

Details of Israel's involvement were largely ignored by Israeli media lest they be interpreted as another blow to Israel's legendary military prowess, which took a bad hit in the Lebanese war against Hezbollah two years ago. Georgia's top diplomat in Tel Aviv complained about Israel's "lackluster" response to his country's military predicament and called for "diplomatic pressure on Moscow." According to the Jerusalem Post, the Georgian was told "the address for that type of pressure is Washington."

Haaretz reported Georgian Minister Temur Yakobashvili -- who is Jewish, the newspaper said -- told Israeli army radio that "Israel should be proud of its military which trained Georgian soldiers" because he explained rather implausibly, "a small group of our soldiers were able to wipe out an entire Russian military division, thanks to Israeli training."

The Tel Aviv-Tbilisi military axis was agreed at the highest levels with the approval of the Bush administration. The official liaison between the two entities was Reserve Brig. Gen. Gal Hirsch who commanded Israeli forces on the Lebanese border in July 2006. He resigned from the army after the Winograd Commission flayed Israel's conduct of its Second Lebanon War. Hirsch was also blamed for the seizure of two Israeli soldiers by Hezbollah.

Israeli personnel, working for "private" companies with close ties to the Israel Defense Forces, also trained Georgian soldiers in house-to-house fighting.

That Russia assessed these Israeli training missions as U.S.-approved is a given. The United States was also handicapped by a shortage of spy-in-the-sky satellite capability, already overextended by the Iraq and Afghan wars. Neither U.S. nor Georgian intelligence knew Russian forces were ready with an immediate and massive response to the Georgian attack Moscow knew was coming. Russian double agents ostensibly working for Georgia most probably egged on the military fantasies of the impetuous Saakashvili's "surprise attack" plans.

Saakashvili was convinced that by sending 2,000 of his soldiers to serve in Iraq (who were immediately flown home by the United States when Russia launched a massive counterattack into Georgia), he would be rewarded for his loyalty. He could not believe President Bush, a personal friend, would leave him in the lurch. Georgia, as Saakashvili saw his country's role, was the "Israel of the Caucasus."

The Tel Aviv-Tbilisi military axis appears to have been cemented at the highest levels, according to YNet, the Israeli electronic daily. But whether the IAF can still count on those air bases to launch bombing missions against Iran's nuke facilities is now in doubt.

Iran comes out ahead in the wake of the Georgian crisis. Neither Russia nor China is willing to respond to a Western request for more and tougher sanctions against the mullahs. Iran's European trading partners are also loath to squeeze Iran. The Russian-built, 1,000-megawatt Iranian reactor in Bushehr is scheduled to go online early next year.

A combination of Putin and oil has put Russia back on the geopolitical map of the world. Moscow's oil and gas revenue this year is projected at $201 billion -- a 13-fold increase since Putin succeeded Boris Yeltsin eight years ago. Not shabby for a wannabe superpower on the comeback trail.

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Taking on Tehran

By Kenneth Pollack and Ray Takeyh
Foreign Affairs, March-April 2005

If Washington wants to derail Iran's nuclear program, it must take advantage of a split in Tehran between hard-liners, who care mostly about security, and pragmatists, who want to fix Iran's ailing economy. By promising strong rewards for compliance and severe penalties for defiance, Washington can strengthen the pragmatists' case that Tehran should choose butter over bombs.


THE TICKING CLOCK

Even as the United States struggles to fix the troubled reconstruction of Iraq, the next big national security crisis has already descended on Washington. Investigators from the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) have discovered that Iran is trying to acquire the capability to enrich uranium and separate plutonium, activities that would allow it to make fissile material for nuclear weapons. Revelations of Iran's massive secret program have convinced even doubtful European governments that Tehran's ultimate aim is to acquire the weapons or, at least, the ability to produce them whenever it wants.

It is an open question whether the United States could learn to coexist with a nuclear Iran. Since the death of Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini in 1989, Tehran's behavior has conveyed some very mixed messages to Washington. The mullahs have continued to define their foreign policy in opposition to the United States and have often resorted to belligerent methods to achieve their aims. They have tried to undermine the governments of Saudi Arabia and other U.S. allies in the Middle East; they have waged a relentless terrorist campaign against the U.S.-brokered Israeli-Palestinian peace process; and they have even sponsored at least one direct attack against the United States, bombing the Khobar Towers--a housing complex filled with U.S. troops--in Saudi Arabia in 1996. Although Tehran has been aggressive, anti-American, and murderous, its behavior has been neither irrational nor reckless. It has calibrated its actions carefully, showed restraint when the risks were high, and pulled back when threatened with painful consequences. Such calculations suggest that the United States could probably deter Iran even after it crossed the nuclear threshold.

There is no question, however, that the United States, the Middle East, and probably the rest of the world would be better off if they did not have to deal with a nuclear Iran. The hard part, of course, is making sure that Tehran never gets to that point. It appears to have made considerable progress in many aspects of its nuclear program, thanks to extensive assistance from Chinese, Germans, Pakistanis, Russians, and perhaps North Koreans. Iran's clerical regime has also shown itself willing to endure considerable sacrifices to achieve its most important objectives.

Yet there is reason to believe that Tehran's course can still be changed, if Washington takes advantage of the regime's vulnerabilities. Although Iran's hard-line leadership has maintained a remarkable unity of purpose in the face of reformist challengers, it is badly fragmented over key foreign policy issues, including the importance of nuclear weapons. At one end of the spectrum are the hardest of the hard-liners, who disparage economic and diplomatic considerations and put Iran's security concerns ahead of all others. At the opposite end are pragmatists, who believe that fixing Iran's failing economy must trump all else if the clerical regime is to retain power over the long term. In between these camps waver many of Iran's most important power brokers, who would prefer not to have to choose between bombs and butter.

This split provides an opportunity for the United States, and its allies in Europe and Asia, to forge a new strategy to derail Iran's drive for nuclear weapons. The West should use its economic clout to strengthen the hand of Iranian pragmatists, who could then argue for slowing, limiting, or shelving Tehran's nuclear program in return for the trade, aid, and investment that Iran badly needs. Only if the mullahs recognize that they have a stark choice--they can have nuclear weapons or a healthy economy, but not both--might they give up their nuclear dreams. With concern over Iran's nuclear aspirations growing, the United States and its allies now have a chance to present Iran with just such an ultimatum.

THE GREAT DIVIDE

Iran's conservative bloc is riddled with factions and their contradictions. But whereas reformers and conservatives differ over domestic issues, the divisions within the conservative faction chiefly relate to critical foreign policy issues. Stalwarts of the Islamic revolution launched by Ayatollah Khomeini in 1979 still control Iran's judiciary, the Council of Guardians (the constitution's watchdog), and other powerful institutions, as well as key coercive groups such as the Revolutionary Guards and the Islamic vigilantes of the Ansar-e-Hezbollah. The hard-liners consider themselves the most ardent Khomeini disciples and think of the revolution less as an antimonarchical rebellion than as a continued uprising against the forces that once sustained the U.S. presence in Iran: Western imperialism, Zionism, and Arab despotism. Ayatollah Mahmood Hashemi Shahroudi, the chief of the judiciary, said in 2001, "Our national interests lie with antagonizing the Great Satan. We condemn any cowardly stance toward America and any word on compromise with the Great Satan." For ideologues like him, international ostracism is the necessary price for revolutionary affirmation.

The pragmatists among Khomeini's heirs believe that the regime's survival depends on a more judicious international course. Thanks to them, Iran remained a regular player in the global energy market even at the height of its revolutionary fervor. Today, these realists gravitate around the influential former president Hashemi Rafsanjani and occupy key positions throughout the national security establishment. One of the group's leading figures, Muhammad Javad Larijani, a former legislator, argues, "We should not have what I would call an obstinate policy toward the world." Instead, the pragmatic conservatives have tried to develop economic and security arrangements with foreign powers such as China, the European Union, and Russia. In reaction to the United States' overthrow of two regimes on Iran's periphery--in Afghanistan and Iraq--they have adopted a wary but moderate stance. Admonishing his more radical brethren, Rafsanjani, for example, has warned, "We are facing a cruel and powerful U.S. government, and we have to be cautious and awake."

In a similar vein, the issue of Iraq is also fracturing the theocratic regime. In the eyes of Iran's reactionaries, the Islamic Republic's ideological mission demands that the revolution be exported to its pivotal Arab (and majority Shiite) neighbor. Such an act would not only establish the continued relevance of Iran's original Islamic vision but also secure a critical ally for an increasingly isolated Tehran. In contrast, the approach of Tehran's realists is conditioned by the requirements of the nation-state and its demands for stability. For this cohort, the most important task at hand is to prevent Iraq's simmering religious and ethnic tensions from engulfing Iran. Instigating Shiite uprisings, dispatching suicide squads, and provoking unnecessary confrontations with the United States hardly serves Iran's interests at a time when its own domestic problems are deepening. As a result, Tehran's mainstream leadership has mostly encouraged Iraq's Shiite groups to participate in reconstruction, not to obstruct U.S. efforts, and to do everything possible to avoid civil war. Hard-liners, meanwhile, have won permission to provide some assistance to Muqtada al-Sadr's Mahdi Army and other Shiite rejectionists.

Teetering between the two camps is Iran's supreme religious leader, Ayatollah Seyed Ali Khamenei. As the theocracy's top ideologue, he shares the hard-liners' revolutionary convictions and their confrontational impulses. But as the head of state, he must safeguard Iran's national interests and temper ideology with statecraft. In his 16 years as supreme leader, Khamenei has attempted to balance the ideologues and the realists, empowering both factions to prevent either from achieving a preponderance of influence. Lately, however, the Middle East's changing political topography has forced his hand somewhat. With the American imperium encroaching menacingly on Iran's frontiers, Khamenei, one of the country's most hawkish thinkers, is being forced to lean toward the pragmatists on some issues.

THE NUCLEAR CARD

More than any other issue, the pursuit of nuclear weapons has exacerbated tensions within Iran's clerical estate. The theocratic elite generally agrees that Iran should maintain a nuclear research program that could eventually allow it to build a bomb. After all, now that Washington has proved willing to put its provocative doctrine of military pre-emption into practice, Iran's desire for nuclear weapons makes strategic sense. And Tehran cannot be entirely faulted for rushing to acquire them. When the Bush administration invaded Iraq, which was not yet nuclearized, and avoided using force against North Korea, which already was, Iranians came to see nuclear weapons as the only viable deterrent to U.S. military action.

Although Iranian leaders agree on the strategic value of a strong nuclear program, they are divided over just how strong it should be. Conservative ideologues press for a nuclear breakout in defiance of international opinion, whereas conservative realists argue that restraint best serves Iran's interests. The ideologues, who view a conflict with the United States as inevitable, believe that the only way to ensure the survival of the Islamic Republic--and its ideals--is to equip it with an independent nuclear capability. Ali Akbar Nateq-Nuri, a conservative presidential candidate in 1997 and now an influential adviser to Khamenei, dismissed Tehran's recent negotiations with the Europeans, noting, "Fortunately, the opinion polls show that 75 to 80 percent of Iranians want to resist and [to] continue our program and reject humiliation." In the cosmology of such hard-liners, nuclear arms have not only strategic value, but also currency in domestic politics. Iranian conservatives see their defiance of the Great Satan as a means of mobilizing nationalistic opinion behind a revolution that has gradually lost popular legitimacy.

In contrast, the clerical realists warn that, with Iran under intense international scrutiny, any act of provocation by Tehran would lead other states to embrace Washington's punitive approach and further isolate the theocratic regime. In an interview in 2002, the pragmatic minister of defense, Ali Shamkhani, warned that the "existence of nuclear weapons will turn us into a threat to others that could be exploited in a dangerous way to harm our relations with the countries of the region." The economic dimension of nuclear diplomacy is also pushing the pragmatists toward restraint, as Iran's feeble economy can ill afford the imposition of multilateral sanctions. "If there [are] domestic and foreign conflicts, foreign capital will not flow into the country," Rafsanjani has warned. "In fact, such conflicts will lead to the flight of capital from this country."

IT'S THE ECONOMY, STUPID

Despite ample natural resources, Iran continues to suffer double-digit rates of inflation and unemployment. A million young Iranians enter the job market every year, but the economy produces less than half that many jobs. The clerics' penchant for centralization has bred an inefficient command economy with a bloated bureaucracy. Extensive subsidies for basic commodities, such as wheat and gasoline, waste tens of billions of dollars but do little to alleviate poverty. Massive foundations that are philanthropic only in name monopolize key sectors of the economy, operating with little competition, regulation, or taxation. Inefficient state-owned enterprises drain the government budget, and a vast gray market of commercial entities has been spun off from government ministries. The recent increase in oil prices is not a long-term solution to Iran's woes; the economy's flaws run much too deep. Twenty-five years after Iran's revolution pledged to deliver a more just society, the Islamic Republic has spawned an economy that benefits only an elite group of clerics and their cronies and stifles private enterprise.

Reform is possible, but it would require selling off public enterprises and scaling back the government's onerous subsidies. Iran's clerical elite is too implicated in corrupt arrangements and too fearful of losing its prerogatives to endorse measures that would fundamentally alter the structure of the economy. Concerns that an aggressive privatization program would unleash popular dissatisfaction are discouraging reform. Any attempt to restructure the public sector would exacerbate an already inflamed unemployment crisis. The reactionary Council of Guardians is unlikely to countenance privatizing key sectors such as the banking industry, as such measures run counter to Iran's constitution. And a serious campaign against corruption would alienate the regime's remaining loyalists.

Iran's technocrats recognize the country's deepening economic predicament. Muhammad Khazai, the deputy minister of economy and finance, has acknowledged that Iran will need $20 billion in investment every year for the next five years if it is to provide sufficient jobs for its citizens. The oil industry--the lifeblood of Iran's economy--faces an even more daunting challenge. The National Iranian Oil Company estimates that $70 billion is needed over the next ten years to modernize the country's dilapidated infrastructure and is counting on foreign oil companies and international capital markets to provide approximately three-quarters of those massive investments. Given the clerical elite's inability to reform the economy, foreign investments have become critical to Iran's economic revival. Khazai insists, "We should be thinking of drawing foreign investments and [of] prepar[ing] the ground for [an] inflow of foreign capital."

Some officials have gone so far as to suggest that Iran's economic difficulties cannot be redressed if Tehran continues to have such a tense relationship with the United States. The exasperated head of the Management and Planning Organization, Hamid Reza Baradaran Shoraka, has noted that among the major obstacles to the country's development are the economic sanctions imposed by Washington. Continued antagonism toward the United States would hardly ensure that these sanctions are lifted.

As a result, the realists have tried to leverage Iran's nuclear intentions to secure a more favorable security and economic relationship with the United States. Like the North Korean leadership, Iran's clerical oligarchs are hoping to use Tehran's nuclear ambitions to force negotiations with and extract concessions from Washington. In a press conference in September, the powerful secretary of the Supreme National Security Council, Hasan Rowhani, acknowledged that Tehran had held constructive talks with U.S. officials on the war in Afghanistan and suggested that "such negotiations on the nuclear file [are] not totally out of [the] question." Fearful that Iran's feeble economy could not withstand more multilateral sanctions, Iran's pragmatists are willing to back down on the nuclear question to help save the economy.

So far, these competing pressures have resulted in inconsistent government positions. Even as it has agreed to suspend efforts to acquire nuclear capabilities, the Iranian government has insisted that it would never give up its nuclear weapons program and, in fact, has prodded it along. Meanwhile, in an attempt to head off international sanctions, Khamenei has temporarily sided with the realists. Despite calls by clerical firebrands and the Iranian parliament to discard the Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT), in October 2003, he agreed that Tehran would sign the NPT's Additional Protocol, including provisions for a fairly intrusive inspection regime. Last November, Tehran also accepted a deal brokered by France, Germany, and the United Kingdom to suspend uranium-enrichment activities and forgo completion of the nuclear fuel cycle.

A NEW APPROACH

With Tehran divided over how to balance its nuclear ambitions with its economic needs, Washington has an opportunity to keep it from crossing the nuclear threshold. Since the economy is a growing concern for the Iranian leadership, Washington can boost its leverage by working with the states that are most important to Tehran's international economic relations: the western European countries and Japan, as well as Russia and China, if they can be persuaded to cooperate. Together, these states must raise the economic stakes of Iran's nuclear aspirations. They must force Tehran to confront a painful choice: either nuclear weapons or economic health. Painting Tehran's alternatives so starkly will require dramatically raising both the returns it would gain for compliance and the price it would pay for defiance.

In the past, dissension among the United States and its allies allowed Tehran to circumvent this difficult choice. Throughout the 1990s, the United States pursued a strategy of pure coercion toward Iran, with strong sanctions and a weak covert action program. In the meantime, the Europeans refused even to threaten to cut their commercial relations with Tehran, no matter how bad its behavior became. Iran played Europe off against the United States, using European economic largesse to mitigate the effects of U.S. sanctions, all the while making considerable progress with its clandestine nuclear program.

Today, the situation is different. A fortunate result of Iran's unfortunate nuclear progress is that Tehran will now have a much harder time hedging. Revelations that Iran has moved closer toward producing fissile material over the past two years could help forge a unified Western position. In the 1990s, Europeans could ignore much of Iran's malfeasance because the evidence was ambiguous. But with the IAEA recently having uncovered so many of Iran's covert enrichment activities--and with Tehran subsequently having admitted them--it will be far more uncomfortable, if not impossible, for Europeans to keep looking the other way. It is still unclear just how seriously Europe takes Iran's nuclear activities, but in public and private statements, European officials no longer try to play them down. Moreover, when during negotiations with the EU in November Tehran requested that 20 research centrifuges remain active, the Europeans refused. Such resolve marked a drastic departure from Europe's fecklessness during the 1990s. That Tehran quickly complied was a sure sign that it fears incurring the wrath of its economic benefactors.

It may now be possible to fashion a multilateral policy that can persuade Tehran to abandon its nuclear program. Working together, the United States and its allies should lay out two dramatically diverging paths for Iran. On one course, Iran would agree to give up its nuclear program, accept a comprehensive inspection regime, and end its support for terrorism. In exchange, the United States would lift sanctions and settle Iran's claims over the assets of Shah Mohammed Reza Pahlavi. The West would also consider bringing Iran into international economic organizations such as the World Trade Organization, granting Iran increased commercial ties, and perhaps even providing it with economic assistance. Western nations could sweeten the deal by agreeing to assist Iran with its energy needs (the ostensible reason for its nuclear research program) and to forswear direct military attack. The United States could also help create a new security architecture in the Persian Gulf in which Iranians, Arabs, and Americans would find cooperative ways to address their security concerns, much as Washington did with the Russians in Europe during the 1970s and the 1980s. If, on the other hand, Iran decided to stay its current course, U.S. allies would join Washington in imposing precisely the sort of sanctions the mullahs fear would scuttle Iran's precarious economy. These sanctions could take the form of everything from barring investment in specific projects or entire sectors (such as the oil industry) to severing all commercial contacts with Iran if it proved utterly unwilling to address Western demands.

UPPING THE ANTE

In an ideal world, the Iranians would agree to work out all their differences with the West in a single grand bargain. Such a comprehensive deal would serve Washington well, as it would be the fastest way to resolve current disputes and the surest platform from which to build a new, cooperative relationship. In fact, under the presidencies of Ronald Reagan, George H.W. Bush, and Bill Clinton, Washington repeatedly offered such an approach. But conservative ideologues in Tehran repeatedly quashed the efforts of any Iranian who attempted to take up the United States' conciliatory offers. The Clinton administration made nearly a dozen unilateral gestures toward Iran, including the partial lifting of sanctions, to enable the reformist government of President Muhammad Khatami to participate in such negotiations. But these overtures triggered a conservative backlash that eventually debilitated Khatami's government.

Even if a grand bargain seems unlikely given Iran's complicated domestic politics, a policy of true "carrots and sticks" remains a viable option. In this case, Western nations would lay out the same two paths for Iran but would do so as statements of a joint policy, rather than as the goals of bilateral negotiations with Tehran. Officials from the United States, European countries, and Japan--as well as from any other country willing to participate, including China and Russia--would explicitly define what they expect Iran to do and not do. To each of these actions, the allies would attach positive and negative inducements (the "carrots" and the "sticks"), so that Tehran could clearly understand both the benefits it would gain from ending nuclear and terrorist activities and the penalties it would suffer for refusing to end them.

Such an effort will not be easy. The United States and its allies will have a hard time defining clear benchmarks to measure Iran's compliance, and they will likely disagree over how much to reward or punish Tehran at each step. But the approach can work, so long as a few critical measures are applied.

First, the strategy requires that both the potential rewards and the potential penalties be significant. Iranian hard-liners will not abandon their nuclear program easily. Although the mullahs are not as stubborn as North Korean leader Kim Jong Il continues to be--they would not knowingly allow three million fellow citizens to die of starvation just to preserve their nuclear program--they unquestionably are willing to tolerate considerable hardship to keep their nuclear hopes alive. In order to change Tehran's behavior, therefore, the inducements will have to be potent: big rewards that could revive the economy or heavy sanctions that would surely cripple it.

Second, Tehran must be presented with the prospect of serious rewards, not just punishments; Washington must be willing to make concessions to Iran in return for real concessions from it. The most obvious reason for this condition is that the Europeans insist on it. European diplomats have consistently said that they can persuade their reluctant governments to threaten serious sanctions for Iran's continued misbehavior only if the United States agrees to reward compliance with real economic benefits.

The carrots, moreover, need to be as big as the sticks. Only the prospect of significant bonuses will provide ammunition to pragmatists in Tehran who argue that Iran should revise its nuclear stance to secure the benefits necessary to revitalize its troubled economy. Current levels of trade and investment from Europe and Japan have not been adequate to solve Iran's deep-seated economic problems. The pragmatists' case will become convincing only if Tehran's compliance with Western demands can help the Iranian economy do better than it does now. Granting enough economic concessions to maintain the status quo probably would not sway undecided Iranians; significantly more generous incentives might.

The painful experience of trying to make the Iraq sanctions stick during the 1990s suggests another prerequisite for the approach that must be adopted with Tehran. One of the lessons learned from Iraq was that, although many governments threatened Saddam Hussein with sanctions if he defied the international community, few imposed them when he did. Spelling out in advance all of the steps Tehran is expected to take or to avoid, as well as the specific rewards and punishments they would incur, is the best way to prevent Iran and U.S. allies from reneging on their commitments as they did in Iraq.

Last, all incentives must be applied in graduated increments, so that small steps, positive or negative, would bring Tehran commensurate gains or sanctions. For Iranians to even consider forgoing their nuclear ambitions, they will need to see tangible gains from the start, as well as be able to point to a pot of gold at the end. Conversely, Tehran probably will not change course if it does not systematically suffer increasingly severe consequences for its reticence. Without immediate and automatic penalties, it is likely to act as it did throughout the 1990s, dismissing the West's promises and warnings as empty rhetoric while continuing to advance its program under the status quo.

THE LEAST BAD OPTION

There is, of course, no guarantee that such an approach will persuade Tehran to end its nuclear projects or its support for terrorism. Even if Iran does halt these projects, the strategy is far from perfect: at the very least, it will require Washington to live for some time longer with a regime it abhors. But by setting out clearly the rewards Iran would accrue for cooperating and the penalties it would suffer for bucking, a carrots-and-sticks policy would force Iran's leadership to confront the choice it never wanted to make: whether to shelve its nuclear program or risk the crippling of its economy. Because Iran's economic woes have been a major factor in popular discontent with the regime, there is good reason to believe that, if forced to make such a choice, Tehran would grudgingly opt to save its economy and look for other ways to deal with its security and foreign policy aspirations.

This approach also is the best available, for it has a much greater chance of succeeding than the alternatives. Invading Iran simply should not be an option; Washington should not try to deal with Tehran's nuclear program and its support for terrorism as it did with the Taliban and Saddam's regime. The United States is now in the thick of reconstruction in Afghanistan and Iraq, leaving it with very limited forces available to invade another country. Iran's mountainous terrain and large, nationalistic population would likely make any military campaign daunting. Postwar reconstruction would be even more complex and debilitating there than it has been in Afghanistan and Iraq.

Although most Iranians want a different type of government than they have and a better relationship with the United States, it would be foolhardy to believe that Washington could solve its problems with Tehran's nuclear ambitions by staging a coup or inciting a popular revolution to topple the current regime. Young Iranians seem to have a better image of the United States than their elders did, but their greater open-mindedness should not be confused with a desire to see U.S. interference in Iranian politics, something Iranians have responded to with ferocity in the past. Furthermore, although many Iranians may want a different government, they have shown little inclination to do what would be necessary to dislodge the current one. Most are weary of revolutions: when they had the chance to start one, amid student demonstrations in the summer of 1999, few heeded the call. There is good reason to believe that this regime's days are numbered, but little to think that it will fall soon enough or that the United States can do much to speed its demise. Advocating regime change might be a useful adjunct to a new Iran policy, but it will not solve Washington's immediate problems with Iran's nuclear program and its support for terrorism.

Likewise, at present, the costs, uncertainties, and risks of waging an air campaign to destroy Iran's nuclear sites are too great to make it anything but a measure of last resort--the hopes of some in the Bush administration notwithstanding. Because Tehran has managed to conceal major nuclear facilities, it is unclear by how much even successful bombing could set back the country's nuclear development. Moreover, no matter how little damage it suffered, Iran would likely retaliate. It has the most capable terrorist network in the world, and the United States would have to stand ready for a full onslaught of attacks. Perhaps even more important, a U.S. military campaign would probably prompt Tehran to unleash a clandestine war on U.S. forces in Iraq. The Iranians are hardly omnipotent there, but they could make the situation far more miserable and deadly than it already is. Without better intelligence about Iran's nuclear program and better protection against an Iranian counterattack, the idea of a U.S. air campaign should be kept on the shelf as a last-ditch option.

Iran today is at a crossroads. It might restrain its nuclear ambitions to the parameters set out in the NPT, or it might rashly cross the threshold, brandishing the bomb as a tool of revolutionary diplomacy. It might play a positive role in rebuilding a stable Iraq, or it might be a dogmatic actor that exacerbates Iraq's sectarian and ethnic cleavages. As difficult as the U.S. predicament is in Iraq today, Tehran could make it much worse: it could dramatically inflame the insurgency and destabilize its already insecure neighbor. Since the demise of Saddam Hussein, Iran has dispatched clerics and Revolutionary Guards to Iraq and released funds to establish an intricate network of influence there. It is still unclear what the theocracy's specific goals are, but there is concern that they could be at odds with those of the United States.

Much now depends on Washington's conduct, the security environment that emerges in the region, and the extent to which Washington and its allies can force Tehran to choose between its nuclear ambitions and its economic well-being. Given Iran's economic frailty and shifting power dynamics within its leadership, a strategy offering strong rewards and severe penalties has a reasonable chance of discouraging Tehran from its nuclear plans, especially if the Europeans and the Japanese are willing to participate in full. In fact, it is the only plan that has any real prospect of success at present. Rather than continue to criticize everyone else's Iran policy, the United States should stop making perfect the enemy of good enough. Washington has a chance to curb Tehran's alarming behavior, with the help of its allies and without resort to force. If it does not seize the opportunity now, at some point soon it will likely wish it had.

Kenneth Pollack is Director of Research at the Saban Center for Middle East Policy at the Brookings Institution and the author of The Persian Puzzle: The Conflict Between Iran and America. Ray Takeyh is a Senior Fellow in Middle East Studies at the Council on Foreign Relations.

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Putin and Russia's Middle Eastern Policy

By Ilya Bourtman
Middle East Review of International Affairs, June 2006

Russian President Vladimir Putin is currently pursuing a two track policy towards the Middle East, allowing Russia to develop friendly ties with Israel while simultaneously nurturing alternative, sometimes competing, interests with Arab countries. This non-ideological policy has allowed Russia to reclaim a part of the economic and strategic leverage it lost following the collapse of the Soviet Union. Thus far, Russia has successfully signed diplomatic, military, and energy deals and developed ties with both Israel and its Arab neighbors without significantly alienating one or the other. Whether Putin's embrace of Hamas in March 2006 or his continued armament of Iran will damage Russia's relations with Israel is still an open question.


Russia’s Middle East Policy
Russia's policy towards the Middle East today is a far cry from the ideologically-driven, Cold War zero-sum thinking which guided the Kremlin for many years. In fact, Putin's policy towards the region has been anything but ideological. [1] Learning from U.S. policymakers who for many years developed relations with both Arab states and Israel and were thus at an advantage when it came to resolving disputes and capitalizing on economic opportunities, Russian officials now similarly avoid any ideological principle that would force their policy to be zero-sum. As Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov told the Russian newspaper Pravda, "Russia's policy is neither pro-Arab, nor pro-Israel. It is aimed at securing Russian national interests. Maintaining close and friendly ties with Arab states and Israel is among them." [2]

The Kremlin's modus vivendi in the region is marked by pragmatism, cynicism, and economic calculations occasionally mixed with an undertone of anti-Americanism. Russian policymakers recognize that the Middle East is not a primary area of concern, even if it is, increasingly, becoming an area where Russia can exert influence. [3] While Russia plays more than a "niche role" [4] in the region, it lacks the well-defined, long-term strategy necessary to be considered a "real great power." [5] Russia simply cannot penetrate the Middle East as the Soviet Union once could nor does it necessarily have an interest in doing so. Russia's limited capacity to affect change far from her borders forces Russian leaders to distinguish primary from secondary objectives. Tangibly, this has meant that Russia has concentrated on maintaining its traditional role in the region as a leading arms supplier while simultaneously opening new markets to Russian companies. This was demonstrated most clearly when on his only trip to the Middle East in April of 2005, Putin's fellow travelers included the chief executives from the MiG Corporation and Rosoboroneksport (Russian Defense Exports). [6] Indeed, Putin is interested not only in continuing exporting arms to the region, but also expanding the role of Russian companies in the energy sector. For years, Russian firms have been buying oil from Iraq and then reselling it to Europe and the United States, but only recently has Russia begun crafting energy deals with Saudi Arabia, Iran, Syria, Jordan, and even Israel. [7]

Progress in Russian-Israeli Relations under Putin

During Putin's presidency, Israel has come to play an increasingly significant role in Russia's Middle East policy. Putin has done more than any other Russian leader to improve economic and strategic ties with Israel. At the same time, however, the Kremlin's dealings with some of Israel's adversaries have complicated the full development of Russian-Israeli ties, as was seen in the Israeli response to the Kremlin's controversial February 2006 decision to invite Hamas to Moscow for meetings with senior Russian officials.

On the surface, Russian-Israeli cooperation has never been closer. As Putin told his Israeli hosts in late April 2005, "We have all the conditions for success, and most important, there is the will and desire on both sides to strengthen our friendship, trust and cooperation and to build a constructive partnership together." [8] Trade between the countries has doubled under Putin and today amounts to close to $1.5 billion in direct trade, [9] and over a billion in energy deals. Israelis and Russians are working together in sectors spanning heavy industry, aviation, energy, and medicine. Since 1989, almost one million Jews from the former Soviet Union have immigrated to Israel, creating a natural economic bridge between the two countries. Today, they make up approximately 20 percent of Israel's population. As Putin told the Egyptian Newspaper Al-Ahram in April of 2005, Russia "is not indifferent to the fate of these people," [10] many of whom have dual Israeli/Russian citizenship and business ties with both countries. Among the immigrants have been several powerful Russian oligarchs-Leonid Nevzlin, Vladimir Dubov, and Mikhail Brudno (all former partners of Mikhail Khodorkovsky in Yukos), Vladimir Gusinsky (a media tycoon), and Arkadi Gaydamak (a suspected arms dealer). Several of the richest businessmen who invest in Israel are also wanted by the Russian government, which alleges that the men funneled hundreds of millions of dollars into Israeli bank accounts. [11] Thus far, the Israeli government has turned down Moscow's requests for their extradition.

Yet lingering scandals surrounding Russian-Israeli businessmen have not affected cooperation in other areas-most notably, in the energy sector. Although the Israeli government does not publicize its energy exporters-it worries that oil-rich Persian Gulf states who already boycott it may act to close off energy routes for Israel-bound shipments from other countries-one senior-Israeli diplomat revealed that 88 percent of Israel's crude oil comes from Russia. [12] The deal's current structure provides Israel with sour (high sulfur) oil, sometimes of poor quality, at reduced market prices. Moreover, Israel's dependence on Russian energy is increasing. Following a June 2004 meeting between Alexey Miller, the Chairman of Gazprom, and then Prime Minister Sharon, Israel promised to increase the share of Russian gas in its energy balance from one percent to 25 percent by 2025. [13] In November 2005, it was reported that the Blue Stream Natural Gas Pipeline-a $3.4 billion dollar project between Russia and Turkey-would be expanded to Israel through the Eilat-Ashkelon pipeline to allow Russian and Azerbaijani oil and gas to be exported by tanker through the Red Sea to China and through the Suez Canal to Southern Europe. [14] Were the Blue Stream Pipeline to be expanded to Eilat, Israel would instantly become a major regional hub of oil and gas, receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in tariff revenues and, maybe even more importantly, finally achieving some much needed energy security. In March 2006, following a return visit by Alexey Miller to Israel, then acting Prime Minister Ehud Olmert stated that Gazprom had agreed to supply Israel with gas. [15]

The most visible area of cooperation between Russia and Israel has been in counterterrorism. Israel was one of the first nations to offer its support to Russia after the Beslan tragedy in 2004 in which almost 300 people, mostly children, were killed in a hostage standoff with Chechen rebels. "Israel, which has been struggling against terrorism for many years, stands alongside the Russian people and sends its condolences," Ariel Sharon stated, "there is no justification for terrorism and this is the time for the free, just and humanitarian world to unite and fight this horrific plague, which acknowledges neither borders nor limitations." [16] These statements were not a break from the past. Since 1999, Israeli officials have stressed the similarity between Chechen and Palestinian Islamist terrorists, and reiterated the need to respond forcefully to terrorism more broadly. [17]

Following an onslaught of terrorist attacks between 1999 and 2004 on Russian apartment buildings, subways, airlines, and theaters-and inadequate and often bungled responses by Russia's security services-Russia's intelligence services began serious collaboration with their counterparts in Jerusalem. Though Mossad agents secretly held meetings with Russians at the Kremlin during Yeltsin's tenure and Putin's first years in office, the level of cooperation increased dramatically in the post-Beslan security environment. As Ehud Olmert, then Israel's Vice Premier, stated in November of 2004, "I think there is a growing realization in Russia that they [Russians] have to become more prepared for future terror attacks and that it's a good idea to compare notes with us [Israelis]." [18] Senior level talks have focused on three areas: training, border security, and arms. Since 2004, Russian and Israeli anti-terror forces have secretly trained together, and there are plans to hold joint counter-terrorism exercises. [19] The Israeli police, by Moscow's request, also prepared reports detailing alternative responses to the hostage crises at the Nord-Ost Theater and Beslan. [20]

On the issue of border security, Israel has proposed that Moscow reform its intelligence gathering and border-protection agencies. In November 2005, The Jerusalem Post reported that Israeli and Russian experts were jointly developing a plan for a security barrier along the border with Chechnya, similar to the Israeli barrier in Gaza and the West Bank. [21] Finally, as has been widely reported in the Russian and Israeli press, Dmitry Kozak, Putin's envoy to the Northern Caucasus region, has spent the majority of time since his appointment in March 2004 shuttling between Moscow and Jerusalem signing counter-terrorism and arms deals. [22] In November 2005, for example, the state-funded RIA News reported that Kozak had negotiated a deal whereby Israel would sell unmanned flying vehicles to Russia to help patrol the border with Chechnya. [23] Even the tension caused by Hamas' visit to Moscow in March 2006 did not significantly disrupt counterterrorism cooperation between the two countries. A joint counter-terrorism working group-formed between the law enforcement agencies in both countries in the autumn of 2004-met in Israel on March 13, 2006, days after Hamas' visit, to create a single database of international terrorist organizations and their leaders. [24] On the weapons front, the two countries are jointly producing and selling military equipment on the world market including helicopters and AWACS aircraft. [25] In private conversations senior Israeli officials admit that other arms contracts have been signed, but no details have been made public.

Lingering Issues in Russian-Israeli Relations

Yet for all the progress made, major issues of contention remain. Israeli officials are currently most concerned by Russia's continued support for Iran's nuclear programs, despite the Iranian government's explicit threats to destroy Israel. Yet other issues of concern for Israel include Russian arms sales to Syria, Moscow's legitimization of Hamas, and the Kremlin's inattention to rising anti-Semitism in Russia. Russian officials, for their part, have been frustrated by Israeli resistance to Russia's efforts to play a larger role in mediating the Israeli-Palestinian conflict. In the end, however, Israel has much more reason to be worried about Russia's actions rather than the other way around, because it holds far fewer levers of influence by which to affect Moscow's interests.

Most threatening to the future of Russian-Israeli relations is Russia's continued construction of a nuclear reactor in Iran, which most Israelis feel threatens their country's existence. Russia, for its part, does not believe that Israel has much cause for concern. This stems from the fact that while Putin sees his country's dealings with Iran as primarily an "economic issue," Israel views it as a security concern. More so than anyone else, Russians are aware that the market for their antiquated nuclear technology is shrinking, and that the $10 billion agreement they signed in July 2002 to provide Iran with six nuclear reactors over the next decade is a deal the Russian nuclear industry desperately needs in order to stay afloat. [26] The project, which employs several thousand top-grade Russian scientists who would otherwise struggle to find work, pays Russia in hard currency-something many of their other arms importers are reluctant to do. [27] While centered on the sale of nuclear technologies, Russia's cooperation with Iran revolves around other areas as well. As reported in Vremya Novostei in April 2005, Tehran was in the process of purchasing Tu-204 jets and a "communication satellite" from Russia. In exchange for the cooperation, Tehran has floated the idea that Russian companies will be able to play a role in oil and gas projects in Iran. [28]

Israel interprets Russia's dealings with Iran as a threat to its national security. [29] If Iran uses the Russian civilian nuclear technology to build a nuclear weapon, it would cause a radical shift in the regional balance of power, possibly catalyzing a regional nuclear arms race (led by Saudi Arabia and Egypt), and, likely, a nuclear stand-off between Israel and Iran. Giving nuclear technologies to an Iran led by radical ayatollahs and a president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, who denies the Holocaust and repeatedly calls for Israel to be "wiped out from the map of the world," [30] is simply unacceptable to the Israelis. The issue of Iran looms large over all areas of Russian-Israeli relations, so much so that Dr. Robert O. Freedman, a leading expert on Russian-Israeli relations, believes that "Russia is working against Israel on all the major issues." [31] No amount of counter-terrorism cooperation or trade links will be able to save Russian-Israeli relations if Russia remains complicit in Iran's nuclear aspirations.

The issue of Russian-Syrian cooperation is additionally irksome for Israel. Russia and Syria, which are united in their opposition to U.S . hegemony in the Middle East, have a historical record of diplomatic, military, and economic co-operation that dates from the Soviet period. The invitation to Moscow that Putin extended to Syrian president Bashar al-Asad in 2005 was the first such overture by a Russian leader in over a dozen years. "Syria is a country with which the Soviet Union had, and today's Russia has, special [and] very warm relations," [32] said Putin as he welcomed Syrian President Bashar al-Asad to Moscow in late January 2005. With Putin's explicit approval, Moscow forgave 73 percent of the $13.4 billion debt owed by Damascus, a significant amount of money for Russia. [33] Moreover, in April 2005, Russia sold Strelets surface-to-air missiles to Syria, thereby ignoring vocal Israeli and American concerns that the weapons could fall into the hands of Hizballah. [34] When asked on Israeli television whether he felt the sale of the Strelets defense system posed a threat to Israel, Putin won himself few friends in Israel by laughing at the question and stating that "sure, Israeli aircraft will no longer be able to fly over Bashar Asad's palace." [35] Later, in September 2005, Russia sold munitions to Syria and promised to double the number of Syrian officers trained in Russian military academies. [36] Russian officials have also stopped short of confronting Syrian officials over their providing shelter for senior Hamas officials, even though Israeli officials have repeatedly asked them to do so. Russia's arms supplies and cooperation with her Soviet-era client has worried Israeli and American officials who consider Syria to be a "terrorist safe-haven" and a regional menace.

Some of Russia's domestic policies have also irked Israeli officials. Specifically disturbing was Putin's continued refusal to put Hamas and Hizballah on Russia's list of terrorist organizations, allowing money to flow freely from Russia to two of Israel's worst enemies. This concern became especially pronounced when in March 2006 Putin invited Hamas to Moscow claiming that Russia was in a unique position to do so since, unlike the United States and the EU, it had "never considered Hamas a terrorist organization." [37] At the time, Israeli Education Minister Meir Sheetrit compared Putin's invitation to Hamas to a hypothetical Israeli invitation of Chechen leaders: "[Putin], I believe, would feel very bad if Israel were to invite the Chechen terror organizations into Israel and give them legitimacy." [38] Other Israelis shared the belief that it was hypocritical for Russian officials to travel to Jerusalem and ask Israeli intelligence services for help in countering their own terrorist threat if the Kremlin was simultaneously acknowledging terrorist organizations seeking Israel's destruction.

From the position of the Israeli foreign ministry, equally worrisome has been the Kremlin's indifference to the spike in anti-Semitism in Russia in 2004 and 2005-due to what the Russian think-tank SOVA calls a "general growth of xenophobic sentiments in the society" and the "growth of ultra-nationalist organizations." [39] On November 4, 2005, for example, ten thousand neo-fascists marched down the main streets of Moscow carrying signs with swastikas and giving Nazi salutes to onlookers. In the weeks that followed, Putin's Kremlin issued no condemnation, giving the impression that those instigating hate and violence in the Russian capital would not face punishment. Israeli fears were confirmed when a few months later, on January 11, 2006, a skinhead ran into Moscow's main synagogue with a knife screaming "Heil Hitler!" In the mayhem that ensued, the 20-year old neo-Nazi stabbed eight people before being arrested. [40] One Israeli Foreign Ministry official worries that the Kremlin will move to assuage the concerns of Russia's Muslim population, numbering some 20 million, over controversial issues such as Chechnya by allowing anti-Semitism to fester. [41] It is conspicuous that Putin closed down two Russian newspapers for printing cartoons of the prophet Mohammed just days before Hamas visited Moscow. [42] The official's opinion might have been further vindicated by Putin's statements on a visit to Chechnya in December 2005 when he told Chechen militants that in fact "Russia has always been the most loyal, reliable and consistent defender of Islamic interests." [43] The president's political statement is telling, given that Orthodox Russia is becoming increasingly Muslim due to higher Muslim birthrates and the unprecedented rate of conversion to Islam. [44]

For some in Israel's defense community, this conglomeration of events paints a rather disturbing picture-one of a Russian state willing to help Israel's enemies and violate Israel's basic security requirements. Senior Israelis in the defense industry openly wonder whose side Russia is really on. In talking to the Israeli defense establishment about Russia's objectives in the region, the word most frequently used is "suspicion"-suspicion about its post-imperial ambitions, suspicion about its unchecked arms trade, and suspicion about its behind-the-scenes dealings. [45] Some Israelis believe that Putin misled them when he promised in 2002 that "Russia will never help Israel's enemies." [46] Many wonder aloud whether Russia is reverting back to its Soviet-era policies, especially in the wake of Putin's official embrace of Hamas.

Russian officials have also, on an intermittent basis, objected to Israel's policies. They regularly join the chorus of voices condemning Israel at the United Nations for Israeli incursions into the occupied Palestinian territories, and they have protested Israeli threats against Iran and Syria. In fact, out of 21 UN votes relating to Israel going back from September 2004, Russia voted against Israel 17 times and abstained only four times. [47] This trend may have been motivated in part by Russia's perception that Israel has been reluctant to allow Russia a greater role in mediating the Arab-Israeli conflict. For several years, Putin has been positioning himself as such-joining the Quartet, supporting the Road Map for Peace, building ties with both Israel and her Arab neighbors-but at least thus far, his advances have been largely rebuffed. During his visit to Israel in May 2005, Putin proposed that Moscow host a Mideast Peace Conference for senior Israeli and Palestinian officials in January 2006. While the Palestinians accepted the proposal, Israelis simply brushed it aside. [48]

Impact on Russia's Other Interests in the Middle East

Russia's relationship with Israel does not occur in a vacuum. Rather, it has an effect-direct or indirect-on Russia's other interests in the Middle East. Syria and Iran are most directly affected by continuing Russian-Israeli cooperation, but other Russian partners, including the Palestinian Authority, Algeria, Saudi Arabia, Egypt, and Yemen are also involved. On occasion, Russia's relationship with Israel has impeded its ties with other countries and, in the case of Syria, done so in rather dramatic ways.

As Russia has tried to reposition itself from being a benefactor to being a partner of the Arab states, there has been a general nostalgia among some for a more "Soviet" Russian foreign policy in the Middle East. Sometimes this comes through in public statements, sometimes in private requests. Often regional leaders remind Russian leaders of their historical ties to the Arab world. Speaking to students at the Moscow State Institute of International Relations in January 2005, Syrian President Bashar Asad asserted that "Russia's role in the world is very large, and it has a colossal authority, especially in the countries of the Third World." [49] He went on to state that "in these countries, there are great hopes that Russia will restore its earlier positions in world affairs." [50] Egypt, whom Russia supplies with hardware, cars, and trucks and with whom Russia is in discussion over the sale of a research satellite and portable missiles, is also mindful of the historical ties that bind the countries. [51] As Egyptian Foreign Minister Ahmed Abul Gheit told Putin during his visit to Egypt in April 2005, "Egypt remembers its friends who have always supported that country in hard times." [52] Meanwhile Algeria, which signed a $7.5 billion arms contract with Russia in March 2006, has similarly expressed hope that Russia will become more active in the Middle East. [53] For countries that hope to see Moscow revert to Soviet-era policies in the Middle East by cooling relations with Israel and placing political and personal concerns above economic calculations in dealings with the Arab states, Russian cooperation with Israel cannot be a welcome sign. Russia's invitation to Hamas in March 2006 as well as its pledge to forgive Algeria $4.74 billion of its Soviet era debt that same month must be seen, at the very least, as an attempt to placate these Arab concerns.

Syria

The country most directly affected by Russia's increasingly warm ties with Israel has been Syria, which has seen the quantity and quality of its arms supplies cut as Russian-Israeli cooperation has increased. This tension became especially pronounced in the highly publicized arms negotiations of recent years. Since 2003, reports have surfaced about Russia's potential sale to Syria of Iskander-E high-precision surface-to-air missiles, shoulder-fired Igla SA-18s, Strelets missiles, S-300 PMU2 air defense missiles, and the Tor-M1 advanced air defense system. [54] Taken together, weapons sales of this magnitude could dent in Israel's military superiority in the region and, as some defense analysts in Russia gently pointed out, threaten U.S. soldiers serving in Iraq. [55] Israeli and American authorities jointly pressured Russia to abandon the weapons deal, citing their joint fear that such weapons would fall into the wrong hands. In January 2005, Former Israeli Prime Minister Shimon Peres told the Associated Press that any missile sales to Syria were unacceptable, arguing that "we have enough problems on the ground in Syria and we don't need more problems from the sky." [56] Meanwhile, American officials warned Putin that any advanced weapons sales to Syria would jeopardize the Bush-Putin summit in Bratislava scheduled for February 2005. [57]

Israeli and American pressure eventually bore fruit when Putin shelved the deal in late 2004, but not before expressing several choice words. Putin accused "Israeli sources" of pouring "huge sums of money" [58] into the presidential campaign of Viktor Yushchenko in Ukraine-an opposition leader whom the Kremlin opposed-and of unduly threatening Syria's President Asad. Only later, once the deal was taken off the table, did Putin take personal credit for stopping the transfer of "serious systems" to Syria. As he later boasted to the Russian daily Kommersant in January 2006, "The negotiations really took place. Our military people were ready to supply Syria with the new missile systems 'Iskander,' but I prohibited realization of this." [59] In the end, even though some Strelets missiles were sold to Syria, Russia did everything in its power to assuage Israeli concerns. Another independent Russian newspaper, Nezavisimaya Gazeta, reported in February 2006 that "insiders say that the Russian military informed its Israeli colleagues of the tactical-technical characteristics of the SAMs." [60] This was a clear indication that Russia was attempting to minimize the fallout from its weapons sale to Syria. Mark N. Katz, an expert on Syrian-Russian relations, believes that Israeli pressure on Russia succeeded in changing Moscow's weapons sale to Damascus: "Indeed, the fact that Moscow would not sell Syria the air defense missiles it apparently wanted most (S-300, Iskander-E, and Igla) due to American and Israeli objections must have been a clear indication to Damascus of how sensitivity to Israeli security concerns limits the extent to which Moscow is willing to cooperate with Syria." [61] The case of Syria demonstrates Putin's attempts to maintain traditional Arab allies while simultaneously building relations with Israel.

There are several reasons why Putin gave into Israeli and U.S. pressure. For one, Russian-Israeli trade in absolute terms is far greater than Russian-Syrian trade, thus making it more costly to jeopardize relations with Jerusalem. Additionally, as Russian defense analyst Ruslan Pukhov pointed out in Nezavisimaya Gazeta, "selling weapons to this country [Syria] would solve problems of one or two Russian companies but will not change the situation in the military-industrial sector." [62] Finally, Syria has historically failed to repay debts to Russia and its lack of hard currency made the arms sale questionable on economic grounds. In the end, the total value of the Strelets missile sale was only $100 million, in part because this was a sum the Syrians could pay on the spot.

The fact that Russia did everything in its power to assuage Israeli security fears-while at the same time going through with a deal that enriched Russian arms manufacturers-certainly could have done little to please the Syrians. It also did not help that in March 2005, Russia sided with the United States, Europe, and Israel in pressuring Syria to withdraw from Lebanon following the assassination of former Lebanese Prime Minister Rafiq Hariri. At the time, Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov defended the action by stating that he was acting in accordance with a UN Security Council Resolution, but his forceful demand that "Syria must withdraw from Lebanon" [63] must have come as a surprise to Damascus.

Since Syria's withdrawal from Lebanon, however, Russian officials have attempted to mend the rift in their relationship. Chief of the General Staff Yuri Baluyevsky traveled to Syria for three days in February 2006 to meet with President Asad and other top Syrian officials. Among the topics discussed were Hamas (some of whose leadership is based in Syria) and the prospects for new weapons deals. Some Russian military analysts predicted that Russia would again propose to sell the Tunguska mobile air defense system to Damascus. [64] Overall, however, it is clear that Putin's warming relationship with Israel in 2004 and 2005 strongly affected Russia's strategic choices regarding Syria.

Iran

While Russian-Israeli cooperation has had a direct impact on Russian-Syrian relations, it is far less clear how much of an impact it has had on Iran. On one hand, following Iranian President Mahmoud Ahmadinejad's declaration in October 2005 that Israel should be wiped off the map, Russia took the unprecedented step of condemning the statements of the Iranian leader-something it has consistently refrained from doing out of fear that an escalation in rhetoric could have unintended consequences on the nuclear relations between the two countries. In a clear effort to calm Israeli concerns, Russian Foreign Minister Sergey Lavrov called Ahmadinejad's comments "unacceptable" and promised to "bring this to the attention of the Iranians." [65] He further admitted that comments such as those made by Ahmadinejad damaged Russia's interests with Iran and give "an additional argument to those who favor transferring the Iranian nuclear issue to the UN Security Council." [66]

At the same time, however, Israeli objections have had no affect either on Russia's arms sales to Iran, or on the even more contentious issue of Russian-Iranian nuclear cooperation. As the Russian Defense Minister Ivanov stated in December 2005, "Russia is supplying Iran with conventional armaments and military hardware such as armored vehicles and air defense equipment of a limited range. This is ordinary commercial trade and we are not going to end it." [67] Andrei Piontkovsky, a well respected Russian analyst, argued in March 2006 that the Russian sale of the Tor M1 9M330 Air Defense System to Iran takes away Israel's final option at a military strike against Iran's nuclear installations. [68] If he is correct, Russia will have not only sold nuclear technologies to Iran but also tacitly protected Iran's nuclear program.

Palestinian Authority

Although there is little evidence that Russia's ties with Israel have damaged its relations with the Palestinian Authority, it is clear that Palestinian leaders have been surprised by the recent expansion of cooperation between Moscow and Jerusalem over the past several years. This is understandable given the Soviet Union's role as the leading benefactor and champion of Yasir Arafat, Fatah, and the Palestinian cause during the 1970s and 1980s. Russia's first president, Boris Yeltsin, while reducing Russia's involvement in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict, continued to support the Palestinian Authority, for instance, sending 50 armored personnel carriers to the Authority in 1994. [69] When Putin came to power in 2000, support for the Palestinian Authority continued, especially at the United Nations-where Russia repeatedly voted against Israeli actions in the Palestinian territories. On his only visit to the territories in April 2005, Putin visited the grave of Yasir Arafat and promised to "provide the Palestinian leadership with technical help, supplies of equipment and training." [70] It later emerged that Putin had promised the Palestinians 50 armored personnel carriers, two Mi-17 military transport helicopters, and training for their security services. [71] Only after substantial prodding from the Israeli military establishment did Putin renege on his commitments to the Palestinians. Russia has, however, left open the possibility of sending the helicopters to the newly elected Hamas government. [72]

Assessing Putin's Israel Policy

While Putin's actions towards Israel are certainly a break from the past in many ways, his cooperation with Hamas, Syria, and Iran are too dramatic to ignore. What explains this policy of working with Israel, while also working with Israel's enemies? There are several explanations, ranging from broader structural shifts to lasting personal interests.

International dynamics have changed drastically in recent years, compelling the Kremlin to reexamine its historically pro-Arab policies in the Middle East. With the Soviet Union gone, the Kremlin has seen its international relevance and prestige plummet. Making the transition from impractical super-power geopolitics to pragmatic and level-headed foreign policy of a rising power has proven to be a difficult task, especially in a region where the Soviets used to exert heavy dominance, but has since been drifting increasingly westward towards the United States. As a result, Russia is sometimes forced to sit on the sidelines as many of its former arms importers and trade partners, such as Syria, Iraq, and Iran, are castigated as pariah states by Americans carrying the torch of democracy.

Beyond classroom tales of lost grandeur and frustration rooted in political impotence lie murkier personal and economic interests. During the Soviet-era, many high-level relationships were formed between diplomats, spies, and businessmen in Moscow and their counterparts in the Arab capitals of the Middle East. These connections, dating back to the arms trades of the 1960s-1980s, are especially tight among the old-timers in the Russian military who have friends in high-posts in the energy-rich Persian Gulf states. Some of these men even fought and lost alongside the Arabs against Israel in 1973. Many are still embarrassed by the fiascos of the 1960s and 1970s, when the Soviets passed forged documents to the Egyptians to precipitate the war of 1967, or when Soviet Sinai defenses were overrun by Israeli armored divisions. Many in the Kremlin continue to view Israel in much the same light as it was viewed by the Party apparatus in the 1950s-as "an agent of American imperialism." [73]

The clearest example of this type of Soviet thinking in the post-Soviet era has been expressed by Yevgeny Primakov, Boris Yeltsin's Arabist foreign minister. Throughout the 1990s, Primakov encouraged Yeltsin to move Russia away from Israel and towards some of the Soviet Union's more traditional allies-notably with Saddam Hussein's Iraq. These deals of the past continue to cast a long and dark shadow on current events, helping to explain why top Kremlin operatives and politicians, including the former Chief of Staff for Putin and Yeltsin, are at the center of the United Nations Oil-for-Food Scandal. [74] Russia's close relationship with Syria can similarly be seen as a result of close interpersonal relations. Pavel Felgengauer, one of Russia's top defense analysts, believes that the relationship can be attributed to the "powerful pro-Syrian lobby in the Kremlin." [75] He points specifically to Viktor Ivanov, a confidant of Putin's who also heads Almaz-Antei, a Russian monopoly producing anti-aircraft weapons systems. If not for the personal interests and sympathies of high ranking government officials in the Kremlin, it is possible that Russia would temper its policies of arming Syria, legitimizing Hamas and Hizballah, and sharing nuclear technologies with dangerous Islamist clerics.

Putin's Real Goals vis-a-vis Israel

Given the new international context and the lingering personal interests within his government, Putin has had the unenviable task of steering his country's Middle East policy. While he has relied on Israel to diversify Russian economic interests and train Russia's beleaguered security apparatus, he has also used the high visibility of the Israeli-Palestinian conflict to position himself in the eyes of the international community as a key actor in the peace process. All along, Putin has tried to market Russia as an independent, unbiased party with a large role to play in solving the Israeli-Palestinian conflict.

Due to the uncertainty about what Russia's future policies will be towards Israel and the rest of the Middle East, there are few high probabilities. Yet one thing is certain. Given that Russia will take its turn as President of the G-8 this year, and that the meeting with be held in St. Petersburg, Putin will feel pressure to project Russian power. For Israel, this will mean more of Russia's involvement in Israeli-Palestinian affairs as Putin tries to counterweigh the negative portrayal of his country as a leading weapons and energy supplier. Putin will also continue to sit on the proverbial two chairs. For a country whose prestige and power have declined precipitously in the last two decades, Putin has done an effective job of leveraging competing interests in one of the world's most volatile regions.

The ambiguity of his two track policy causes confusion and difficulties for some of Moscow's allies in the region, but from Russia's perspective, Putin has succeeded in gaining an economic foothold, developing neutral or warm ties with all the states therein, and maintaining Russia's seat at the adults' table. A final goal of Putin's may be to use Russia's increasing influence in the Middle East as a bargaining chip with the United States. It is possible that Russia is cozying up to governments and organizations with questionable objectives in the Middle East, so as to later trade a pledge of "non-interference" with the United States-by pledging to keep out of the Middle East, Russia could demand that the U.S. keep out of the Caucasus and Central Asia.

In this young new millennium, relations between adversaries seem to have been turned on their head. The historically anti-Israel Kremlin now cooperates with the Jewish state, while it is the Arab states who agonize over the future of their leading arms supplier and historic benefactor. Ultimately, however, as the past several years have demonstrated, Putin will continue to employ a two track policy which is likely to gradually strengthen Russia's position in the region. So long as Putin can avoid being cornered by the international community into "choosing sides," Russia will gain from building ties with both Israel and her enemies.

Ilya Bourtman is a Russian studies intern at AEI.

Notes

[1] One could in fact make the case that the neoconservatives in the Bush Administration have supplanted the Soviet Communists as the leading ideologues trying to reshape the region.

[2] Sergey Borisov, "Russia and Israel to join forces in anti-terrorist cooperation," Pravda, September 7, 2004.

[3] For Russian policymakers, the "Middle East" is only of primary strategic importance if it includes Central Asia, the Caucasus, and Turkey-what is typically referred to as the "Greater Middle East." Wars, insurgencies, the spread of radical Islamic networks, and the proliferation of nuclear materials in the Middle East all pose a threat to Russia's interests in the "near-abroad."

[4] Ibid. Olga Oliker and Natasha Yefimova, "Workshop on the Future of the Greater Middle East and the Prospects for U.S.-Russian Partnership," Carnegie-RAND Occasional Paper, July 2004.

[5] Robert Freedman, "Russia in the Middle East: Is Putin Undertaking a New Strategy?" Middle East Institute, Lecture, February 10, 2005.

[6] Liudmila Romanova, "Security. Putin offers the Middle East peace and weapons," Gazeta, April 27, 2005, p. 2.

[7] Oliker and Yefimova, "Workshop on the Future of the Greater Middle East."

[8] Russian Foreign Ministry Press Release, available online at: http://www.rusembcanada.mid.ru/pr/050505_3.html.

[9] "Major Israel-Russia Trade Agreement Signed," FJC, March 22, 2006 as available online at: http://www.fjc.ru/news/newsArticle.asp?AID=371602.

[10] "Interview with Egyptian Newspaper Al Ahram," Kremlin.ru, April 25, 2005.

[11] "Scandal.Israel: Rich Repatriates Harassed," The Moscow News, March 16, 2005; "Israel's Sharon Not to Extradite Russian Oligarchs," The Moscow News, April 22, 2005.

[12] Personal interview with senior Israeli foreign ministry official.

[13] "Israel interested in Gas Contracts with Russia," Izvestiia, June 2, 2004; "Gazprom to Supply Israel, Syria," Moscow Times, September 3, 2004.

[14] Alexsey Gribatch, "'Goluboy potok' prevrashayetsia v kol'tzo" [Blue stream pipeline turning into a ring], Vedomsti, November 28, 2005.

[15] "Israel, Russia Reach Preliminary Gas Agreement," RFE/RL, March 19, 2006.

[16] Joel Leyden, "Israel to Russia: Tears for Children Murdered by Islamic Terrorism," Israel News Agency, September 5, 2004.

[17] Personal interview with senior Israeli Foreign Ministry official, Washington DC, November 17, 2005.

[18] "Israel offers to help Russia fight terror," Associated Press, September 15, 2004.

[19] "Israel send experts to help Russia," USA Today, September 15, 2004.

[20] Kaakov Katz, "Israel Police to study school siege," The Jerusalem Post, September 5, 2004.

[21] The Jerusalem Post, November 8, 2005.

[22] Boris Levich, "Dmitriy Kozak Izuchayet Izrayelskiy opit" [Dmitry Kozak Studying Israeli Experience], Izvestia, August 11, 2005.

[23] "Rossiya zakupit v Izrayeli letashuyi roboti" [Russia buying flying robots in Israel], Lenta, December 11, 2005.

[24] Nikolai Kerzhentsev, "RF, Israel law-enforcers to discuss fight against terrorism, crime," Itar-Tass, March 13, 2006.

[25] Robert O. Freedman, "Russian Policy Towards the Middle East Under Putin: The Impact of 9/11 and The War in Iraq," Alternatives: Turkish Journal of International Relations, Vol. 2, No. 2 (Summer 2003), p. 67.

[26] Victor Mizin, "The Russia-Iran Nuclear Connection and U.S. Policy Options," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 8, No. 1 (March 2004). Available online at:
http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2004/issue1/jv8n1a7.html.

[27] Freedman, "Russian Policy Towards the Middle East Under Putin," p. 82.

[28] Andrei Zlobin, "Security. Putin May Visit Iran," Vremya Novostei, April 20, 2005, p. 5.

[29] Efraim Inbar, "The Need to Block a Nuclear Iran," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1, (March 2006), Available online at: http://meria.idc.ac.il/journal/2006/issue1/jv10no1a7.html.

[30] "Iranian leader: Wipe out Israel," CNN, Available online at:
http://www.cnn.com/2005/WORLD/meast/10/26/ahmadinejad/

[31] Interview with Robert O. Freedman, former President of Baltimore Hebrew University, November 19, 2005.

[32] "Putin calls for boosting ties with Syria," Itar-Tass, January 25, 2005.

[33] Nabi Abdullaev, "Assad Praises Russia, Wins Debt Deal," Moscow Times, January 26, 2005.

[34] Mark N. Katz, "Putin's Foreign Policy toward Syria," Middle East Review of International Affairs, Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006), pp. 55-59.

[35] Maria Grishina and Yelena Suponina, "Israel asks Russia not to sell missiles," Vremya Novostei, April 22, 2005, p. 1.

[36] Ivan Gorshkov and Igor Plugatarev, "Arms deals discussed in Syria," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 2, 2006, p. 5.

[37] Ezra Halevi, "Russia, United Nations and Meretz warming to Hamas," Israel National News, January 11, 2006.

[38] Oksana Yablokova, "Putin's Gamble with Hamas," Moscow Times, January 13, 2006.

[39] "Anti-Semitism in Russia. Tendency 2004," SOVA Center, November 13, 2004. Available online at: http://xeno.sova-center.ru/6BA2468/6BB4208/47E15F6?print=on.

[40] Andrew E. Kramer, "Skinhead raids synagogue in Moscow, stabbing 8," New York Times, January 11, 2006.

[41] Personal interview with senior Israeli Foreign Ministry official, Washington DC, November 17, 2005.

[42] Igor Khrestin, "Putin's Pander," Daily Standard, March 8, 2006.

[43] "Vladimir Putin claims Russia is the major supporter for the Islamic countries," Pravda, December 14, 2005.

[44] Harley Balzer, "Demography and Democracy in Russia: Human Capital Challenges to Democratic Consolidation," Demokratizatsiya, Vol. 11, No. 1 (Winter 2003), p. 102.

[45] Interviews conducted during the summer of 2005 while working for the Begin-Sadat Center for Strategic Studies.

[46] Zakhar Gelman, "Sharon treated to Kosher Dinner," Rossiiskaya gazeta, October 2, 2002, p. 2 as cited in Mark N. Katz, "Putin's Foreign Policy toward Syria," Middle East Review of International Affairs , Vol. 10, No. 1 (March 2006), p. 55.

[47] Herb Keinon, "Israel Urges Russia to Back Fence at U.N.," The Jerusalem Post, September 7, 2004, p. 1.

[48] Scott Peterson, "Russia asserts itself in Mideast," The Christian Science Monitor, April 28, 2005.

[49] Nabi Abdullaev, "Assad Praises Russia, Wins Debt Deal," Moscow Times, January 26, 2005.

[50] Ibid.

[51] "Egypt to buy Russia's VAZ cars, assemble KamAZ trucks," Itar-Tass, April 27, 2005.

[52] Dmitry Tarasov, "Egypt praises highly Russia's role in Middle East," Itar-Tass, April 26, 2005.

[53] Veronika Romanenkova, "Putin, Bouteflika focus on contacts with Hamas, Iraq, terrorism," Itar-Tass, March 10, 2006; Aleksei Nikolsky, "Putin returns with $7.5 billion in defense orders," Vedomsti, March 13, 2006, p. A2.

[54] Ruslan Pukhov, "Military Cooperation: Israel as an Important Source of Technologies," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 25, 2005.

[55] Pavel Felgengauer, "Military Cooperation. The Iglas Putin is Playing," Novaya Gazeta, January 21-23, 2005, p. 6.

[56] Lyuba Pronina, "Russian Missiles Put Israel on Alert," Moscow Times, January 13, 2005.

[57] Katz, "Putin's Foreign Policy toward Syria," p. 58.

[58] Pronina, "Russian Missiles Put Israel on Alert."

[59] "The Problem of S-300 Supply of Iran Reminds of the Problem connected with Missile Systems Supply of Syria a year ago," Defence & Security, January 18, 2006. Published originally in Kommersant, January 14, 2006.

[60] Ivan Gorshkov and Igor Plugatarev, "Arms deals discussed in Syria," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 2, 2006, p. 5.

[61] Katz, "Putin's Foreign Policy toward Syria," p. 59.

[62] Ruslan Pukhov, "Military Cooperation: Israel as an Important Source of Technologies," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, April 25, 2005.

[63] Maksim Yusin, "Russia take a new look at the axis of evil," Izvestia, March 4, 2005, p. 4.

[64] Ivan Gorshkov and Igor Plugatarev, "Arms deals discussed in Syria," Nezavisimaya Gazeta, January 2, 2006, p. 5.

[65] "Russia Condemns Iranian president's statement on Israel," Agence France Presse, October 27, 2005.

[66] Ibid.

[67] "Iran Interested in Russian Weapons - Ambassador," Mosnews.com, December 23, 2005.

[68] Andrei Piontkovsky, "Posledneya Razvilka Putina," [Putin's Last Crossroads], Grani.ru , March 1, 2006. Available online at: http://www.grani.ru/opinion/piontkovsky/m.100333.html.

[69] Molly Moore, "Putin Calls Arms Aid No Threat to Israel," The Washington Post, April 30, 2005, p. A12.

[70] "Putin, Palestinian leaders meet," USA Today, April 29, 2005.

[71] Moore, "Putin Calls Arms Aid No Threat to Israel."

[72] Vaniamin Ginodman, "Hamas in Armor," Gazeta, January 15, 2006, p. 10.

[73] Gregg Rickman, "Palestinian Diplomacy - Gorbachev's Legacy," Middle East Quarterly, Vol.7, No. 1 (March, 2000). Available online at: http://www.meforum.org/article/38.

[74] "Putin's Former Chief of Staff Voloshin Made Fortune Trading Iraqi Oil - Report," The Moscow News, July 10, 2004.

[75] Pavel Felgengauer, "Military Cooperation. The Iglas Putin is Playing," Novaya Gazeta, January 21-23, 2005, p. 6.

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